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Monday, July 16, 2012

周顯: 上司公司天才人物 (16-Jul-2012 MP) 張鴻在念中文大學商學院時

http://realforum.zkiz.com/thread.php?tid=37254

(16-Jul-2012 MP)
張鴻在念中文大學商學院時,已經是高材生,我記不起他是一級榮譽或二級甲等畢業。由於他長得高大靚仔,在大學時,接任了一份旅行團領隊的高薪兼職,這份優 差人工高、福利好,兼且有得免費遊埠,所以一直是中文大學學生代代流傳的「遺產」,由一位師兄傳給張鴻,而張鴻畢業時,又傳了給一位師弟,這就是薪火相 傳,但有沒有傳至今日,則不得而知了。
張鴻畢業後的第一份工,應該是在百富勤當分析員,以當時百富勤的聲勢,這份工應該比今日的高盛更勝一籌了。也許是他曾經在美國的大學當過交換生吧,總之他有「西方來的賓客」之雅號,這雅號另有一個簡潔本,不贅。
他在創業前的最後一份工,應該是在國泰君安,在2000 年後的君安,是快速驚人的幾年。我記得張鴻的助手Icy 是少數懂得股票的後輩,我們都覺得她非池中物,但不知她的近况如何了。
大學時代已是高材生
為什麼我會提起張鴻這位「賓客」呢?因為那天我發現了他既是朗力福(8037) 的主席, 又是中國金石(1380)的行政總裁,就我所知,這是開創前從所未有的先河。真的是天才式的人物。
有一個朋友,打電話來問功課,就是問我中國金石的前景。我說,我約了張鴻星期三打牌,到時一定去探他的口氣。
至於當日張鴻的腳,除了我之外,還有清洪。因為張鴻有一個一生最大的冤屈,據他所言,不惜花數百萬元打官司,都要還回清白。所以我特意約埋金牙大狀,看看有沒有機會為他洗清那次的受氣。當然了,在打牌時,他非得鬆章不可。

============

 有無睇呢份野

http://www.mmt.gov.hk/eng/reports/SKIC_Report_Part_I.pdf

Mr Ben Cheung
59. Mr Ben Cheung had first met Mr Peter Yau whilst they were at university in Hong Kong in the period 1987 to 1991. Mr Ben Cheung worked as a broker for Guotai from 2001 until the autumn of 2008. He was involved in Guotai’s role in the public listing of Sino Katalytics, as China Northern in 2003.

He was an executive director, as was Mr Peter Yau, of Sino Katalytics from its listing until mid-2004. Notwithstanding his resignation from the board of Sino Katalytics, Mr Ben Cheung said that he maintained his frequent social contact
with Mr Peter Yau.

...
There is no doubt that Mr Ben Cheung played a crucial role in the genesis of the placement and in bringing it to fruition. We are satisfied that inevidence he downplayed that role, only reluctantly accepting that he actually
played a greater role when confronted by contemporary records or other evidence. He was an unreliable and untruthful witness.
去下龍鳳區留言啦,唔好去吹水區,大家谷旺個人氣吧
http://realforum.zkiz.com/viewforum.php?fid=148
~greatsoup 


=============



i

The report of the Market Misconduct Tribunal into dealings
in the shares of Sino Katalytics Investment Corporation
on and between 2 January  2009 to 9 January 2009

Part I :  A report pursuant to section 252(3)(a) and (b) of the Securities and
Futures Ordinance, Cap 571

INDEX

   Paragraphs
Chapter 1  The Financial Secretary’s Notice

1
Chapter 2  The Law

2-17
Chapter 3  The Material Received by The Tribunal  18-87
 Background  18-20
  Trading in the shares of Sino Katalytics  21-28  
  The explanations by Mr Peter Yau and Mr
Duncan Chui for their respective
sales and purchases of Sino Katalytics
shares on 9 January 2009
29-42  
  SUBSEQUENT RELEVANT EVENTS
Announcements:

43-44

  13 January 2009: suspension of
trading
 
  15 January 2009: placement    
  12 January 2009  45-47  
  12 January 2009 - trading in Sino
Katalytics shares
48-50  
  Sino Katalytics Board Meeting  51-52  
  13 January 2009  53  
  The placement agreement  54  
  Steps taken to place the shares with
placees
55-58  

ii

   Paragraphs
  Mr Ben Cheung  59-70  
  Placing letters  71  
  Placement proceeds  72  
  The accounts of Mr Duncan Chui and Mr
Peter Yau as to the genesis and
development of the placement of Sino
Katalytics shares
73-87  
Chapter 4  A Consideration of the Material Received  88-114
 
Attestation to Part I of the Report



iii

INDEX – APPENDICES

   PAGE
Appendix I  A summary of the material received by the
Tribunal

A1-A7
Appendix II

Schedule of Mr Peter Yau and Mr Duncan
Chui respective trading and the percentage
their holdings represented of the issued share
capital of Sino Katalytics

A8-A9
Appendix III

Stock Historical Data records for the period 1
December 2008 to 13 February 2009

A10-A11
Appendix IV

Orders and Trades executed for Mr Duncan
Chui (via Onshine) and Mr Peter Yau (via
Quam Securities and UOB Kay Hian) in Sino
Katalytics shares on 9 January 2009

A12


1
CHAPTER 1

THE FINANCIAL SECRETARY’S NOTICE

1.   The Tribunal was constituted in  consequence of  the Financial
Secretary’s (“FS”) Notice dated 12 April 2011.

“IN THE MATTER OF THE LISTED SECURITIES
OF SINO KATALYTICS INVESTMENT CORPORATION
(Stock Code 2324)

NOTICE TO THE MARKET MISCONDUCT TRIBUNAL
PURSUANT TO SECTION 252(2) AND SCHEDULE 9
OF THE SECURITIES AND FUTURES ORDINANCE, CAP. 571
(THE “ORDINANCE”)

Whereas it appears to me that market misconduct within the meaning of
Section 274 ( “False Trading”), section 275 ( “Price Rigging” ) and section
278 (“Stock Market Manipulation”) of Part XIII of the Ordinance has or
may have taken place in relation to the securities of Sino Katalytics
Investment Corporation (stock code 2324)(the  “Company”), the Market
Misconduct Tribunal is hereby required to conduct proceedings and
determine -

(a)  Whether any market misconduct has taken place;

(b)  The identity of any person who has engaged in the market misconduct;
and

(c)  The amount of any profit gained or loss avoided as a result of the market
misconduct.

Persons Specified

Mr Chui Tak Keung, Duncan (“Chui”) and
Mr Yau Chung Hong, Peter (“Yau” ).

2
Statement for Institution of Proceedings

1.   At all material times Chui was th e Company’s chairman and executive
director as well as its single largest shareholder and Yau was an
executive director of the Company as well as a substantial shareholder as
that term is defined in the Ordinance.

2.   Between July 2007 and early December 2008 the Company raised
additional capital of $121 million af ter expenses through two rights
issues and two placements.   On 16 December 2008 the Company
issued bonds in the principal amou nt of $8.1 million convertible into
new shares representidng approximately 19.48% of the then issued share
capital at $0.045 per share.

3.   On and between 2 January 2009 and 9 January 2009 (the  “Specified
Period”) Chui and Yau instructed their brokers to transact in the
Company’s shares.  Yau was responsible for 100% of sales in the
Company’s shares on 2 January 2009, 86% of sales in the Company’s
shares on 5 January 2009 and 90% of  sales in the Company’s shares on
6 January 2009.  Chui was responsible for 92% of purchases in the
Company’s shares on 7 January 2009 and 85% of purchases in the
Company’s shares on 8 January  2009.  The closing price in the
Company’s shares was $0.042 on each of those days other than 5
January 2009 when it was $0.041.  Between 2 January 2009 and 8
January 2009 turnover in the Company’s shares averaged 2.6 million
shares.

4.   On 9 January 2009 turnover in the Company’s shares increased to 8.85
million shares and Yau was responsible for 89% of sales, whereas Chui
was responsible for 62% of purchases.    Over 97% of Chui’s purchases
on that day came from Yau’s sales and such purchases took place within
20 minutes of the market close duri ng which time the market price rose
from $0.049 to close at $0.055, a rise of 31% over the previous day’s
close.

5.   Turnover in the Company’s shares  on 12 January 2009 fell to just
650,000 shares and the closing pric e dropped from $0.055 to $0.054.
Neither Yau nor Chui transacted in the Company’s shares on that day.

3

6.   Chui and Yau did not work from the same office premises but
communicated by office and mobile telephone frequently during the
Specified Period.

7.   In compliance with paragraph 8 of Appendix 10 to the Rules Governing
the Listing of Securities on The St ock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited
(the  “Model Code”) Yau notified Chui as th e Company’s chairman of
his intention to deal in the Company’s shares and obtained prior written
acknowledgment.  In similar complia nce Chui informed Yau of his
intention to deal in the Company’s shares and obtain prior written
acknowledgment.  In compliance with the provisions of Part XV of the
Ordinance both Chui and Yau notified the Company’s corporate
communications officer once they had dealt in the Company’s shares.  
The corporate communications of ficer’s duties included furnishing
appropriate disclosure notices to  the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong
Limited and maintaining the required register of direct ors’ interests.

8.   Chui told the Securities and Futures Commission (the “SFC” ) in
interviews that as a re sult of the July 2008 rights issue Yau increased his
interest in the Company beyond his  own, also that in August 2008 Chui
negotiated to purchase 55 million shares in the Company from Yau in an
off-market transaction, also that he thereafter wished to monitor Yau’s
shareholding as he was concerned to remain the single largest
shareholder.

9.   The corporate communications officer’s duties also included furnishing
Chui with copies of directos’ disclosure notices and, commencing
around August 2008, maintaining in spread sheet form a record of Yau’s
interests and sending a copy to Chui  whenever Yau’s interest changed.

10.  By reason of the means by which they complied with the Model Code,
each of Chui and Yau had advance know ledge of the other’s intention to
deal in the Company’s shares.    By reason of instructions given to the
corporate communications officer, Chui knew when Yau had dealt in the
Company’s shares.


4
11.  On 31 December 2008 Yau complied with the Model Code and
informed Chui of his intention to acquire 6 million shares in the
Company at $0.042 from 2 January 2009 to 6 January 2009.  On 8
January 2009 Yau again complied with the Model Code and informed
Chui of his intention to dispose of 8 million shares in the Company at
$0.050 on 9 January 2009.    Chui acknowledged both notifications.

12.  On 2 January 2009 Chui complied with the Model Code and informed
Yau of his intention to acquire 10.5  million shares in the Company at
$0.047 from 5 January 2009 to 9 January 2009.    Yau acknowledged the
notification.

13.  Chui told the SFC in interviews that he was pleased to learn of Yau’s
notification to dispose.    He was prep ared to pay market price in order
to maintain a higher level of inte rest.    He guessed he was buying on 9
January 2009 those shares Yau was selling.

14.  Yau told the SFC in interviews that although he had seen Chui’s
notification to acquire he did not know if Chui had in fact purchased.  
That his desired selling price was se t by having to meet margin calls on
his account, also to have funds  in advance of Chinese New Year.

15.  In interviews with the SFC both Chui and Yau denied working with each
other on the afternoon of 9 January 2009 to push up the Company’s
share price, notwithstanding that each knew of the other’s intention to
buy and sell from Model Code notifications.

16.  Chui and Yau were in frequent telephone contact on 9 January 2009 and
their transactions during the 20 minutes  prior to the market close had the
appearance of being coordinated.

17.  On 7 January 2009 Yau approached Guoyuan Securities Brokerage
(Hong Kong) Limited and discussed the  prospects for a placement of the
Company’s shares (the “Placement”).    Discussions continued over the
weekend of 10 and 11 January 2009 and on 12 January 2009 the
Company’s secretary was instructed to convene a board meeting for 5:00
p.m. the same day.    The Company’s boa rd resolved to proceed with the
Placement in order to raise a further $8.31 million by allotting new share

5
equivalent to around 20% of the Company’s then issued share capital,
also at $0.045 per share.  Tradi ng in the Company’s shares was
suspended on 13 January 2009 at 10: 42 a.m.  The Placement was
undersubscribed by 19% and raised $6.76 million.

18.  The transactions in most of the sh ares disposed of by Yau and acquired
by Chui on 9 January 2009 were undertaken in a manner designed to
manipulate the market in the Company’s shares ahead of the Placement.

19.  Accordingly, Chui and Yau engaged  or may have engaged in market
misconduct contrary to sections  274, 275 and 278 of the Ordinance.



Dated this 12
th
 day of April 2011

[Signed]
(John C. Tsang)
Financial Secretary”.

6
CHAPTER 2

THE LAW

False trading
2.   Section 274(1) of the Ordinance provides that :
“(1) False trading take s place when, in Hong Kong or elsewhere, a
person does anything or causes anything to be done, with the intention that,
or being reckless as to whether, it has, or is likely to have, the effect of
creating a false or misleading appearance -
(a)  of active trading in securities  or futures contracts traded on a
relevant recognized market or by  means of author ized automated
trading services; or
(b)  with respect to the market for,  or the price that dealings in,
securities or futures contracts  traded on a relevant recognized
market or by means of authorized automated trading services.
…
(3)  False trading takes place whe n, in Hong Kong or elsewhere, a
person takes part in, is concerned in, or  carries out, directly or indirectly,
one or more transactions (whether or not any of them is a dealing in
securities or futures contracts), with the intention that, or being reckless as
to whether, it or they has or have, or is  or are likely to  have, the effect of
creating an artificial price, or maintaini ng at a level that is artificial (whether
or not it was previously artificial) a price, for dealings in securities or
futures contracts traded on a relevant  recognized market or by means or
authorized automated trading services.
…
(5)  Without limiting the general nature of the conduct which
constitutes false trading under subsec tion (1) or (2), where a person -
(a) …
(b)  offers to sell secutities at a price that is substantially the same as
the price at which he has made  or proposes to make, or knows
that an  associate  of his has made or proposes to make, an offer to
purchase the same or substantially the same number of them; or
(c)  offers to purchase securities at a price that is  substantially the
same as the price at which he has made or proposes to make, or
knows that an  associate  of his has made or proposes to make, an

7
offer to sell the same or substa ntially the same number of them,
[Italics added.]
then, unless the transaction in questi on is an off-market transaction, the
person shall, for the purposes of subs ections (1) and (2), be regarded as
doing something or causing something to be done, with the intention that, or
being reckless as to whether, it has, or  is likely to have, th e effect of creating
a false or misleading appearance -
(i)   where the securities are traded on  a relevant recognized market
or by means of authorized automated trading services, of active
trading in securities so traded; or
(ii)  …
(6)  A person shall not be regarded as having engaged in market
misconduct by reason of false trading taking place through the commission
of an act referred to in subsection (5)(a), (b) or (c)  if he establishes that the
purpose
1
  for which he committed the act was not, or , where there was more
than one purpose, the purposes for which he committed the act did not
include, the purpose of creating a false  and misleading appearance of active
trading in securities, or with respect to the market for, or the price for
dealings in, securities, referred to in subsection (1) or (2) (as the case may
be). [Italics added.]”.

“associate”
3.   Section 245(1) of the Ordiance provides that for Part XIII, unless the
context otherwise requires -
“ ‘associate’, in relation to a person, means -
(a)  the person’s spouse or reputed  spouse, any person cohabiting with
the person as a spouse, the person’s brother, sister, parent,
step-parent, child (natural  or adopted) or step-child;
(b)  any corporation of which the person is a director;
(c)  any employee or partner of the person;
(d)  where the person is a corporati on, each of its directors and its
related corporations and each director or employee of any of its
related corporations;
                                               
1
    The burden imposed is the persuasive burden of proof, which is discharged on the balance of probabilities
[see paragraph 88 of the judgment of Gleeson NPJ in the Court of Final Appeal in Fu Kor Kuen & Another v
HKSAR, unreported, FACC No. 4/2011; 24 May 2012
  to the effect that is the burden  even in criminal proceedings.]

8
(e)  without limiting the circumstances  in which paragraphs (a) to (d)
apply, in circumstances concerning the securities of or other
interest in a corporation, or rights  arising out of the holding of such
securities or such interest, any  other person with whom the person
has an agreement or arrangement -
(i)  with respect to the acquisition, holding or disposal of
such securities or such interest; or
(ii)  under which they undertake to  act together in exercising
their voting power at ge neral meetings of the
corporation;”.

“active trading”
4.   In having regard to the phrase “activ e trading” the Tribunal is to have
regard to all the material received in respect of trading in Sino Katalytics
Investment Corporation (“Sino Katalyti cs”) shares in the Specified Period,
namely on and between 2 and 9 January 2009, and is not confined only to a
consideration of the number of such trades.

“likely”
5.   The word “likely” means that it is more probable than not.    It is not
necessary that the false or  misleading appearance, as  particularised in section
274(1)(a) or (b), is created .  Breach of the section  occurs when a person does
anything or causes anything to be done with the intention that, or being reckless
as to whether, it has, or is likely to have, the effect of creating that result.    [See
paragraph 42 of the judgment of Mason J in the High Court of Australia in
North v Marra Development Ltd  4 ACLR 585 in construing section 70 of the
Securities Industry Act 1970 (NSW) :
“A person shall not create or cause to  be created or do anything which is
calculated to create, a false and misleading appearance of active trading in

9
any securities on any stock market in the State, or a false or misleading
appearance with respect to the market for, or the price of, any securities.”.

“Reckless”
6.   The Chairman has directed the Tribuna l in respect of the ingredient of
recklessness in accordance with the judgm ent of Sir Anthony Mason NPJ, with
whose judgment all the other judges agre ed, in the Court of Final Appeal in Sin
Kam Wah v HKSAR [2005] HKCFAR 192 at paragraph 44, page 210 D-G.    A
person acts recklessly in respect of a circum stance if he/she was aware of a risk
which did or would exist, or in respect of  a result if he was aware of a risk that it
would occur, and it was, in the circumstances known to him unreasonable to
take the risk.    If, due to his/her age or  personal characteristics, he/she genuinely
did not appreciate or foresee the risks invo lved in his/her actions he/she is not
reckless.

Price rigging
7.   Section 275 of the Ordinance provides that :
“(1) Price rigging takes place when, in Hong Kong or elsewhere, a
person -
...
(b)  enters into or carries out, directly or indirectly any fictitious or
artificial transaction  or device, with the intention that, or being
reckless as to whether, it has th e effect of maintaining, increasing,
reducing, stabilizing or causing fluctuations in the price of
securities, or the price for dealings  in futures contracts, that are
traded on a relevant recognized ma rket or by means of authorized
automated trading services.
…
(3)  For the purposes of subsections (1)(b) and (2)(b), the fact that a
transaction is, or at any time was, inte nded to have effect  according to its

10
terms is not conclusive in determining wh ether that the transaction is, or was,
not fictitious or artificial.
(4)  A person shall not be regarded as having engaged in market
misconduct by reason of price rigging  taking place through any transaction
of sale or purchase of securities referred to in subsection 1(b) … if he
establishes
2
  the purpose for which the securities were sold or purchased was
not, or, where there was more than  one purpose, the purpose for which the
securities were sold or purchased did  not include, the purpose of creating a
false or misleading appearance with re spect to the price of securities.”.

Stock market manipulation
8.   Section 278 of the Ordinance provides that :
“(1)  Stock market manipulation takes place when, in Hong Kong or
elsewhere -
(a)  a person enters into or carries out , directly or indirectly, 2 or more
transactions in securitie s of a corporation that by themselves or in
conjunction with any other transaction increase, or are likely to
increase, the price of any securities traded on a relevant recognized
market or by means of authorized automated trading services, with
the intention of inducin g another person to purchase or subscribe
for, or to refrain from selling, securities of the corporation or of a
related corporation or  of the corporation;”.
The word “likely” means that it is more probable than not.

The Standard of Proof
9.   Section 252(7) of Ordinance provides that :
“ … the standard of proof  required to determine any  question or issue before
the Tribunal shall be the standard of pr oof applicable to civil proceedings in
a court of law.”.

10.  That standard is the “balance of probabilities”.    In Solicitor (24/7) v
The Law Society of Hong Kong  [2008] 2 HKLRD 576 the Court of Final Appeal
                                               
2
    The persuasive burden, on the balance of possibilities.

11
accepted, the correctness of the approach to the civil st andard of proof expressed
by Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead in Re H & Others (Minors) (Sexual Abuse:
Standard of Proof)  [1996] AC 563 at p 586 D–G :
“The balance of probability standard means that a court is satisfied an event
occurred if the court considers that,  on the evidence, the occurrence of the
event was more likely than not.    When assessing the probabilities the court
will have in mind as a factor, to whatever extent is appropriate in the
particular case, that the more serious the allegation th e less likely it is that
the event occurred and, hence, the stronger should be the evidence before
the court concludes that the allegation is established on the balance of
probability.”.

11.  In his judgment in the Court of Final Appeal in  Koon Wing Yee and
Insider Dealing Tribunal  (unreported) FACV No. 19 of 2007 Sir Anthony
Mason NPJ cited that acceptance with approval (see para graph 89).    That is the
approach to the standard of proof that has been adopted by this Tribunal.

Circumstantial evidence and inferences
12.  In his judgment in the Court of Fi nal Appeal, with which all the other
judges agreed, in HKSAR v Lee Ming Tee (2003) 6 HKCFAR 336 Sir Anthony
Mason NPJ, having cited wi th approval the passage from the speech of Lord
Nicholls quoted above, went on  to address the proper approach to the drawing of
inferences in circumstances of allegati ons of gross misconduct by senior officers
of the SFC.    Sir Anthony said :
“…that conclusion was not to be reach ed by conjecture nor, as the respondent
submitted, on a mere balance of probabilities.    It was to be plainly established
as a matter of inference from proved facts.  It is not possible to state in
definitive terms the nature of the evidence which the court will require in order
to be satisfied, in a civil proceeding, th at a serious allegation of this kind, is
made out.    It would not be right to say  that the requisite standard prescribes
that the inference of wrongdoing is the  only inference that can be drawn (cf

12
Sweeney v Coote  [1907] AC 221 at 222, per Lord Loreburn) for that is the
standard which applies according to the criminal standard of proof.  In the
particular circumstances, it was for the respondent to establish as a compelling
inference that very senior officers of  the SFC had deliberately and improperly
terminated the investigation into Meocre  Li’s conduct for the ulterior purpose
alleged, sufficient to overcome the inhere nt improbability that they would have
done so (see Aktieselskabet Dansk Skibsfinansiering v Brothers & Others (2000)
3 HKCFAR 70 at pp. 91H, 96 G-I, per Lord Hoffmann).”.

13.  Excerpts from the passage quoted above in the judgment of Sir
Anthony Mason NPJ were cite d with approval in the judgment of Mr Justice
Ribeiro PJ (see paragraph 187) in the Court of Final Appeal in Nina Kung alias
Nina TH  Wang and Wang Din Shin  (2005) 8 HKCFAR 387.    In his judgment,
Lord Scott of Foscote NPJ observed, in the context of allegations that Mrs Wang
had procured the forgery and in a cons piracy with another was attempting to
obtain probate as the will of a document  she knew to have been forged, at
paragraph 626 :
“The probability of these allegations be ing true must be judged on the evidence
adduced in the case. But it must also take account of propensity.    If such an
allegation is made against a person with  a record of involvement in forgery or
fraud, the strength of the other evidence  necessary to satisf y the balance of
probability test is obviously less than would otherwise be required.    Evidence
of propensity must go into the balance ... Evidence to a very high standard of
cogency indeed is necessary before the cour t can be justified in finding either to
be dishonestly involved in a conspiracy to promote a forged will.”.

14.  The Tribunal approached the drawing of inferences adverse to the
Specified Persons with those considerations  in mind.    Mindful of the fact that
the conduct alleged against the Specified Persons is of a nature that could have
resulted in the bringing of serious crim inal charges the Tribunal did not draw

13
inferences from proved primary facts that  any one of the Specifiecd Persons was
culpable of the alleged  misconduct unless to do so was very compelling and the
evidence was of a very high standard of cogency indeed.

Lies
15.  The Tribunal has reminded itself in its approach to the evidence of the
respective Specified Persons in the Tribunal and their statements outwith the
Tribunal that a lie in itself does not prove th at the maker of the  lie is culpable of
the misconduct alleged against that pers on.  People innocent of wrongdoing
sometimes tell lies : perhaps, as a mi sguided reaction to a problem, or to
postpone facing up to it or to attempt to deflect ill founded suspicion, or to
fortify their defence.    Nevertheless, it  may be a matter relevant to credibility.

Good character
16.  The Chairman directed  the Tribunal that a Specified Person of good
character is less likely than otherwise  might be the case to have committed the
alleged misconduct and that  good character supports his credibility in respect of
both his evidence in the Tribunal a nd in his records of interview.

Separate consideration
17.  The Tribunal has considered the case against and for each of the
Specified Persons separately.  Statements made outwith the Tribunal,
inconsistent with the oral testimony of the maker in the proceedings before the
Tribunal, are not evidence of the truth of the matters there asserted.    Having
had regard to whether or not in true context the assertion outwith the Tribunal is

14
inconsistent in a material particular w ith oral testimony and to any explanations
proffered for that inconsistency, th e Tribunal may have regard to the
inconsistency in respect of the credibility of the witness.

15
CHAPTER 3

THE MATERIAL RECEIVED BY THE TRIBUNAL
3


Background
18.  Sino Katalytics, now known as Capital VC Limited, was incorporated
in the Cayman Islands on 13 November 2002 as China Northern Enterprises
Investment Fund Ltd (“China Northern”).    The company’s shares were listed
on the Stock Exchange of Hong K ong on 27 October 2003, when 50 million
shares were placed to professional inve stors.    Guotai Junan Securities (Hong
Kong) Ltd (“Guotai”) acted as co-lead managers in th e listing.    Mr Peter Yau
Chung Hong (“Mr Peter Yau”) was a shareholder a nd one of the several
executive directors.  Mr Ben Cheung Hung (“Mr Ben Cheung”), then an
employee of Guotai, was a non-executive  director of Sino Katalytics from its
listing until 6 August 2004.

19.  In January 2005, Mr Duncan Chui  Tak Keung (“Mr Duncan Chui”)
became a shareholder and executive director of Sino Katalytics.   Then, Sino
Katalytics acquired a 30% in terest in the shareholding of CNI Bullion Limited
(“CNI Bullion”), which had been formed in March 2005 and which provided
services in respect of bullion trading. In  April 2005, Mr Peter Yau disposed of
his shareholding in Sino Katalytics, but remained as an executive director.  In
November and December 2005, Mr Duncan Chui began acquiring Sino
Katalytics shares, becoming its biggest  shareholder, holding 26.25% of its
shares in the latter month.    The comp any changed its name to Sino Katalytics
on 12 January 2006.
                                               
3
   See Appendix I.

16

20.  On 2 July 2008, Mr Peter Yau began acquiring Sino Katalytics shares
in his own name and in the name of his wholly owned company, Sellwell
Enterprises Ltd.  At that date Mr  Duncan Chui’s holding of Sino Katalytics
shares had fallen to 11.06% of the issued  capital.    By about the end of August
2008, Mr Peter Yau had increa sed his shareholding of Si no Katalytics shares to
about 18.5% of its issued share capital, whilst that of Mr Duncan Chui remained
at 11.3%.  By an off-market trad e on 28 August 2008 Mr Duncan Chui
acquired 55 million Sino Katalytics shares from Mr Peter Yau, thereby reducing
the latter’s shareholding to 12.6% and increasing that of Mr Duncan Chui to
17.25% of the issued share capital of Sino Katalytics.  Thereafter, Mr Duncan
Chui increased his shareholding of Sino Katalytics to more than 23% by
mid-November 2008. [See a schedule of  their respective trading and the
percentage their holdings represented  of the issued share capital of Sino
Katalytics at Appendix II]

Trading in the shares of Sino Katalytics
21.  There is no dispute that at all material times Sino Katalytics was a
thinly traded stock.  The Stock Hist orical Data records for the period 1
December 2008 to 13 February 2009 illustrate the point. [see Appendix III]

Trading in the shares of Sino Katalytic s by Mr Duncan Chui and Mr Peter Yau
on and between 2 to 9 January 2009
22.  Purchases by Mr Peter Yau: volume and price per share
  2 January 2009  2,000,000 shares at 4.2 cents;

17
  5 January 2009  50,000 shares at 3.8 cents
    50,000 shares at 3.7 cents
    2,000,000 shares at 4.1 cents;
  6 January 2009  2,050,000 shares at 4.1 cents
    700,000 shares at 4.2 cents.

23.  Sales by Mr Peter Yau: volume and price per share
  9 January 2009  2,000,000 shares  at 5.0 cents-through Quam
    1,000,000 shares at 5.1 cents-through Quam
    900,000 shares at 5.5 cents-through Quam
    1,000,000 shares at 4.9 cents-through Barclays/UOB
    2,000,000 shares at 5.0 cents-through Barclays/UOB
    1,000,000 shares at 5.1 cents-through Barclays/UOB.

24.  Purchases by Mr Duncan Chui through Onshine: volume and price
per share
  7 January 2009  400,000 shares at 4.2 cents
    1,950,000 shares at 4.1 cents;
  8 January 2009  250,000 shares at 4.1 cents
    2,200,000 shares at 4.2 cents;
  9 January 2009  850,000 shares at 5.5 cents
    100,000 shares at 5.4 cents
    1,300,000 shares at 5.1 cents
    2,200,000 shares at 5.0 cents
    1,000,000 shares at 4.9 cents.

18

25.  97.2% of the Sino Katalytics shares  purchased by Mr Duncan Chui on
9 January 2009 were sold to him by Mr  Peter Yau.  Prior to their first
transaction, at 15:39:14 for the purchas e and sale of one million Sino Katalytics
shares at 4.9 cents per share, the only  two earlier purchases and sales of the
shares that day were at 11:43:03, of 50,0 00 shares at 4.2 cents per share, and at
14:54:21 of 500,000 shares at 4.4 cents pe r share.    The last transaction between
them that day was at 15:59:52 involve d the sale of 800,000 Sino Katalytics at
5.5 cents per share.    That also proved to  be the closing price of Sino Katalytics
shares that day, it having risen from the  closing price of 4.2 cents on 8 January
2009.

26.  In a period on and between 15:37 :43 and 15:59:22, through a
combination of Quam Securities  Limited (“Quam Securities”) and
Barclays/UOB Kay Hian (Hong Kong) Li mited (“Barclays/UOB”), Mr Peter
Yau placed eight selling orders of one  million Sino Katalytics shares each.    In
the period on and between 15:39:14 and 15:59:52, Mr Duncan Chui placed nine
buying orders for a total of 5.45 million Sino Katalytics shares.    The latter’s
‘Bid’ price rose from 4.9 cents to 5.5 cents.

27.  The pattern of their orders and the  executed orders in that period is
illustrated by exhibit 11 to  the witness statement of Mr Eric Cheng Kai Sum
(“Mr Eric Cheng”), a Senior Director  of the Surveillance Department of the
Enforcement Division of the SFC. [See Appendix IV]


19
28.  The relative dominance of the combin ed trading in the period 2 to 9
January 2009 of Mr Peter Ya u and Mr Duncan Chui is illustrated by an extract
from exhibit 9 to Mr Eric Cheng’s witness statement.

Trades conducted by CHUI and YAU in SKIC shares between 2 January 2009 and 10 February 2009
(the Review Period)

  Trading by Duncan Chui and Peter Yau  SKIC shares
  Duncan Chui  Peter Yau  
Date Quantity
Price
Range Quantity
Price
Range
Combined
Dominance
Market
Volume
without
Duncan
Chui and
Peter Yau Volume
Turnover
(HKD) High Low Close
2/1/2009     2,000,000  $0.042  100.0%         - 2,000,000 84,000 0.04 2 0.04 2 0.04 2
5/1/2009   2,100,000
$0.037 -
$0.041
86.6% 325,00 0 2,425,00 0 98,375 0.041 0.037 0.041
6/1/2009   2,750,000
$0.041 -
$0.042
89.9% 310,48 6 3,060,48 6 126,211 0.042 0.041 0.04 2
7/1/2009 2,350,000
$0.041 -
$0.042
   92.2% 200,000 2,550,00 0 104,650 0.04 2 0.039 0.04 2
8/1/2009 2,450,000
$0.041 -
$0.042
   84.5% 450,000 2,900,00 0 120,600 0.04 2 0.03 7 0.04 2
9/1/2009 5,450,000
$0.049 -
$0.055
(7,900,000)
$0.049 -
$0.055
89.3% 950,00 0 8,850,00 0 445,900 0.05 5 0.04 2 0.05 5

The explanations by Mr Peter Yau and Mr Duncan Chui for their respective
sales and purchases of Sino Katalytics shares on 9 January 2009
29.  Although Mr Peter Yau  had brought 6,850,000 Sino Katalytics shares
on and between 2 and 6 January 2009, he explained his sale of 7.9 million Sino
Katalytics shares on 9 January 2009 as his response to persistent margin call
made by Mr Lawrence Hung Sing Kwong (“Mr Lawrence Hung”), his broker at

20
Quam Securities.  He said that often those calls were relayed through his
secretary and that was a cause of embarrassment. In a record of interview,
conducted of him by an officer of th e SFC on 21 May 2009, Mr Peter Yau
explained the circumstances in which he  had come to sell Sino Katalytics shares
on 9 January 2009 :
“… because I can remember that as the Chinese New Year was approaching in
January and the margin amount of his brokerage house ... was damn tightened;
well he then said that … I owe him money; that is what I can remember and then
on 8
th
 $50,000 was deposited on 8
th
 ... well, and he also said, that is, the brokerage
house was dunning him very hard for payment; when I was damn troublesome.
But after I made the calculation (I found) that if I sold  the shares at about that
price, it would just be the case that th ere would be no need for me to make any
payment ... on the contrary, I would make money …”.

30.  However, having listened to a  tape recording of the telephone
conversation he had with Mr Lawren ce Hung on 8 January 2009 during the
course of proceedings in the Tribunal,  Mr Peter Yau accepted that there was
nothing in the tone or language that  Mr Lawrence Hung had used that was
unpleasant.

31.  Mr Lawrence Hung said that his  colleagues in Quam Securities
provided him with a ‘margin report’ each morning identifying those clients of
his of whom a margin call might be made.    It was as a result of such contact
with Mr Peter Yau, his name having appeared in such margin reports, that
payments were made by  Mr Peter Yau to Quam Securities of $8,000 on 2
January, and $50,000 on each of  6 and 8 January 2009.


21
32.  Mr Lawrence Hung identified his voice and that of Mr Peter Yau on
audio tape recordings of conversations in  which he made requ ests for deposits of
money from Mr Peter Yau on 6 and 8 January 2009.   Mr Lawrence Hung’s
request of Mr Peter Yau on 6 January was made in the following way :
“is it convenient for you  to deposit some money in to your account? ... because
you now have 4 million shares of 2324 in your account.”.
The request for the deposit of $80,000 wa s met with a simple agreement by Mr
Peter Yau.    However, as noted earlie r only $50,000 was in fact deposited.

33.  Mr Lawrence Hung’s request of Mr  Peter Yau on 8 January was that
he :
“help (me) out on your account ...  deposit 80,000 bucks, is it okay?”
Mr Lawrence Hung explained, “there is  a shortfall of 204,000 ...”.    Then, he
asked for around $100,000.  Although  Mr Peter Yau responded in the
affirmative to the request, in fact onl y $50,000 was deposited that day in Quam
Securities’s bank account.  Not surprisingl y, in light of that dialogue, in
cross-examination by counsel for Mr Pete r Yau, Mr Lawrence Hung denied that
there was, “some kind of urgency in th e tone and in … the words you used, for
the margins to be deposited by Mr Yau”.

34.  Mr Duncan Chui explained that he had bought Sino Katalytics shares
on and between 7 and 9 January 2009 in part because he considered them to be
good value.    Also, having become awar e that Mr Peter Yau was buying Sino
Katalytics shares in early January he wanted him to be  aware that he too was a
buyer of those shares.    He was motivated to send that messa ge and to be buyer

22
to avoid what had happened in July a nd August 2008, when  Mr Peter Yau had
built up a sizeable holding of Sino Kataly tics shares, surpassing his own holding,
before he became aware of that fact.  Although Mr Dunc an Chui acknowledged
that by 29 December 2008 their respectiv e percentage shareholding of Sino
Katalytics shares was in his favour 23.37%  to Mr Peter Yau’ s 11.86%, he said
that nevertheless he wished to send the latter the message that:
“ ... I would also be interested in maintaining or even increasing my shareholding
level.”.

35.  Although Sino Katalytics purported to  operate the ‘M odel Code for
Securities Transactions by Directors and  Listed Companies’, as provided for by
Appendix 10 of the Listing Rules, both  Mr Duncan Chui and Mr Peter Yau
accepted that there was no timely complian ce with its provisions.    Ultimately,
there was no dispute that the requisite  written notices passing between directors
of their intention to trade in Sino Katalytics shares, the details of those proposed
trades and the signed acknowledgement  of receipt were all prepared
retrospectively by Ms Sarah Tsang Yin  Kau (“Ms Sarah Tsang”).  However,
both men said that messages were sent by the one and received by the other of
the fact that they intended to  trade in Sino Katalytics shares.

36.  Mr Duncan Chui said that in a telephone conversa tion on 8 January
2009 Mr Peter Yau had informed him that he intended to sell  a few million Sino
Katalytics shares the following day.    He was given no other  details.  Mr Peter
Yau responded to Mr Duncan Chui’s enquiry as to why he was selling shares,
given that he had been buying them in th e previous few days, by explaining that
“he needed the money”.

23

37.  For his part, Mr Peter Yau said that to the best of his memory on 8
January 2009 he had told Mr Duncan  Chui by telephone that he wished to
dispose of 7 to 8 million Sino Katalytics  shares.    In response to his enquiry as
to why he wished to do so,  he had said simply that he  needed money.    He had
hoped that Mr Duncan Chui might offer to  buy his shares in a block trade, as he
had bought from him in August 2008.    Howe ver, no offer was forthcoming.

38.  Mr Duncan Chui said that although he had checked trading activity in
Sino Katalytics shares on the market se rvice provided by ET Net in the morning
of 9 January 2009 it was not until he had noticed two ‘Sell’ Orders for 1 million
Sino Katalytics shares, made at 15:37 and 15:38 respectively, that he had
responded with a ‘Buy’ orders at 15:39.    He explained that his “biggest and
main objective was to buy the shares from Mr Yau, if I could.”    He went on to
say that, given what he had been told the previous day, he  was expecting Mr
Yau to be selling.  He added :
“ … so my only motivation going into the  market on that day is to look for his
shares. It has nothing to do with whether th e price was four cents or five cents or
six cents, because in my mind, you know, the shares should have been worth ten
cents, twelve cents.”.
Of his object, he said:
“…my main motivation was to protect my  interests and perhaps to fight off any
threat that Mr Yau was posing to me.”

39.  Mr Duncan Chui accepted from the telephone records that he and Mr
Yau had spoken to one another at 11:46 on 9 January 2009, shortly after the only
matched transaction in Sino Katalytics shares that morning (50,000 shares at 4.2

24
cents), but they had not discussed trading in Sino Katalytics shares in that
telephone conversation.

40.  In a period of about 20 minutes follo wing his first purchase at 15:39 at
4.9 cents per share Mr Duncan Chui  brought a total of over 5 million Sino
Katalytics shares, the last purchase of which was at 5.5 cents per share.

41.  Of the alternative method of acquiring Mr Peter Yau’s shares, namely
by a ‘block trade’ off-market, Mr Duncan Chui said    :
“I wasn’t prepared to do  another bought-sold note arrangement with Mr Yau after
the August transaction.  Second of all, I was … I couldn’t read him: he was
buying on a few days and suddenly he wa s selling.    So I could only speculate
and I just did not want to get into anot her detailed discussion or negotiation with
him.”.

42.  Of his sale of Sino Katalytics shar es on 9 January 2009, Mr Peter Yau
said, that he did not know that Mr Duncan Chui was the buyer.

SUBSEQUENT RELEVANT EVENTS
Announcements :
13 January 2009: suspension of trading in Sino Katalytics shares
43.  At 10:42 on 13 January 2009 trading in the shares of Sino Katalytics
on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong  was suspended.  The market was
informed by Mr Duncan Chui, on behalf of  the Board, that was at the request of
the company, “pending the release of an  announcement in relation to a top-up
placing”.



25
15 January 2009: placement
44.  On 15 January 2009, Sino Katalytics announced to the market that on
13 January 2009 it had entered into a placing agreement with Guoyuan in those
terms.    Of the placing price, it was said that it represented:
“(i) a discount of approximately 16.67% to the closing price of HK$0.054 per
Share as quoted on the Stock Exchange on the Last Trad ing Date; (ii) a discount
of about 4.26% over the average closi ng price per Share of about HK$0.047 as
quoted on the Stock Exchange for the last five trading days up to and including
the Last Trading Date; and (iii) a disc ount of about 82.53% to the unaudited net
asset value per share of HK$0.2576 as at 31 December 2008.”.
The last trading day was defined as being:
“12 January 2009, being the la st trading day immediately prior to the suspension
of trading in share pending the publication of this announcement.”.
Of the use of the anticipated net proceeds of the placement of approximately $8
million it was stated:
“Depending on market conditions and availa bility of investment opportunities, the
Board intends to apply the net proceeds fo r future potential investment in working
capital.”.

12 January 2009
45.  In the morning of 12 January 2009  Mr Peter Yau held discussions
with Mr David Hui Lam Chiu (“Mr David Hui”) of Guoyuan Securities
Brokerage (Hong Kong) Ltd (“Guoyuan”) at which the subject of Guoyuan
acting as the placing agent in a placing by Sino Katalytics was discussed.    Mr
Ben Cheung, recently employed by Guoyua n, had suggested the meeting to Mr
Peter Yau, arranged for it to take place and was pres ent at least at some of the
meeting.


26
46.  Mr David Hui, the responsible officer of Guoyuan and in charge of its
Equity and Capital Market Department, said that he met Mr Peter Yau of Sino
Katalytics for the first time at a meeting on the premises of Guoyuan in the
morning of 12 January 2009.    The meet ing was attended by  Mr Ben Cheung,
who had suggested a meeting for business discussions between the parties
earlier that morning.  At the meeting,  for the first time, Mr Ben Cheung
identified a placement by Sino Katalytics as being the specific business
concerned.  He was told it was to be  a top-up placement.  He could not
remember which of the other men had told  him that.    He said Mr Ben Cheung
was present in the meeting throughout.    Mr Peter Yau stipulated the price of
the placement shares to be 4.5 cents.    He did so, “as a matter of fact”.    There
were no discussions.  In prospect, this was to be Mr David Hui’s first
placement as a placement agent.

47.  A letter to Guoyuan from Sino Katalytics signed by Mr Peter Yau
bearing facsimile data transmission fr om Guoyuan and the date and time of
“12:51 12 Jan 2009” recorded the acceptance by Mr Peter Yau on behalf of Sino
Katalytics of Guoyuan as the placing agent.

12 January 2009 - trading in Sino Katalytics shares
48.  Trading in Sino Katalytics shares  was very thin on 12 January 2009,
turnover being only 650,000.  No transactions were executed at all until
15:44:10 when a ‘Bid’ that had been made at 10:13:23 to buy 500,000 shares at
4.8 cents per share was  matched by an offer to sell 100,000 shares.  At
15:47:05 a second tranche of 150,000 shares was matched at 4.8 cents per share.  

27
The final transaction of the day occu rred at 16:10:07 when a ‘Bid’ made at
16:06:11 to sell 400,000 shares at 5.4 cents  per share was matched in respect of
350,000 shares. The closing price of Si no Katalytics shares that day was 5.4
cents per share.

49.  The buyer of the 350,000 shares trad ed at 16:10:07 shares was Ms
Chan Wai Yan, an employee and colleague of Mr Peter Yau at CNI Bullion.  
She had been employed as the marke ting and sales mana ger in CNI Bullion
since 2007.    She described Mr Peter Yau  as her “big boss”.    At the invitation
of Mr Ben Cheung, whom she had known  for some years, she had become a
non-executive director of Longlife Group Limited in January 2010.  In
December 2008, she traded in Sino Katalytics shares in her Citic Securities
account and at the end of that month held 1 million Sino Katalytics shares.
Although she could not remember why it was that she had bought 350,000 Sino
Katalytics shares at the end of trading on 12 January 2009, it must have been
because she thought the share price would rise.    She did not ask anyone at CNI
Bullion about buying those shares nor did anyone make any such suggestion.
Certainly, she did not discuss buying the shares with Mr Peter Yau.    She did
not want him to know that she was trading in shares during her working hours.  
Similarly, she never discussed securities with Mr Ben Cheung.

50.  Ms Chan Wai Yan said that through Yahoo! Finance she thought that
she had seen the price at  which Sino Katalytics shares had traded in the 15-20
minutes prior to her own purchase, namely in the range 4.8-4.9 cents.    She said
that perhaps she had paid 5.4 cents  because she was unable to buy Sino

28
Katalytics shares at this lower price range.    Further, she said that she placed her
order earlier in the day and it had been matched.    However, there were no other
orders at all that day by her broker.

Sino Katalytics Board meeting
51.  A meeting of the Board of Sino Katalytics was arranged for and took
place at 5 p.m. on 12 January 2009.    The meeting was c onducted by way of
telephone conference in which Mr Alex  Chow, the third executive director of
the company, participated with Mr Duncan Chui and Mr Peter Yau together with
non-executive directors.  Mr Duncan Chui and Mr Peter Yau ha d separate
offices in different buildings in diffe rent parts of Hong Kong.  The minutes
were made up several weeks later by the company secretary, Mr Kasper Chan
Kwan Pak (“Mr Kasper Chan”), who was present at the meeting.    They record
that the board resolved to authorise a  director to execute a placing agreement
with Guoyuan, as placing agent, to place up to 184,850,000 new shares of the
company to no fewer than six placees in dependent of the company at 4.5 cents
per share.

52.  The first draft agreements prepared  by solicitors on instructions of
Guoyuan and sent to Sino Ka talytics on the evening of 12  January 2009 were in
the form suitable for a top-up placement, not the issue of new shares  simpliciter.
Mr David Hui said that evening he  had a telephone conversation with Mr
Duncan Chui which he initiated but he could not recall what they discussed.



29
13 January 2009
53.  At 10:15:49 an order to sell 1 million Sino Katalytics shares had been
placed by Mr Lawrence Hung for the account  with Quam Securities in the name
of Mr Terence Hui Wai Yung (“Mr Terence Hui”), the brother-in-law of Mr
Peter Yau.    The order ma tched a buy order for 1 million Sino Katalytics shares
and a sale was made, establishing the traded price  that morning.  Mr Terence
Hui said that he had given full discre tion to trade in that account to Mr
Lawrence Hung.    The latter denied that to be case and said that he received
specific instructions for each trade.  The sell order was placed immediately
after Mr Lawrence Hung received a telephone call from Mr Peter Yau.

The placement agreement
54.  By the afternoon of 13 January 2009 the new draft placement
agreement called for the issue of new sh ares only.    That agreement, dated 13
January 2009, was signed by  Mr Peter Yau and Mr Davi d Hui on behalf of Sino
Katalytics and Guoyuan resp ectively.    For its part, Guoyuan undertook to use
its “best efforts” only to secure placees , rather than committing themselves as
underwriting the placement.    Expenses were to be borne by Sino Katalytics.

Steps taken to place the shares with placees
55.  For his part, Mr David Hui said that he adopted a “couldn’t care less”
attitude to whether or not the agreem ent was brought to fruition.    Guoyuan bore
no risk.    He took no steps whatsoever for  several days to secure any placees.  
Then, on 14/15 January 2009 he contacted Mr Ben Cheung and sought his help.  
He said that he did so because, although Mr Ben Cheung was a new colleague,

30
he understood him to have good connections  with brokers in the industry.    In
response, Mr Ben Cheung came down to his office and wrote out in his own
hand a simple schedule of brokers, a ccount executives and account holders,
providing contact details of account execu tives and a stipulation of the monetary
size of their participation in the placement.  The pape r on which Mr Ben
Cheung wrote out the schedule bore facsimile transmission data including the
date, “2009-1-14”.    As far as Mr David Hui recalled, Mr Ben Cheung had not
made any telephone calls before writing out the schedule, which he made in one
sitting.

56.  Mr David Hui testified that he had contacted the persons identified by
Mr Ben Cheung in the schedule.  He did not contact anybody other than
persons stipulated by Mr Ben Cheung.    When he contacted those persons he
did not try to “sell” the placement, nor was he asked any questions about Sino
Katalytics.    He simply identified the company by its stock code, stipulated the
placement price, namely 4.5 cents, and asked if the  recipient of the call was
interested.    He said that he got the  impression that there had already been a
disclosure of information of the placement to them.    That disclosure could have
been before or after the announcement of the placement by the company.

57.  For his part, Mr David Hui crea ted a spreadsheet in which he
replicated the information set out in  the handwritten schedule made by Mr Ben
Cheung and updated it to reflect the prog ress of commitments in the placement.
On one of the copies of the spreadsheet he had written “please check the

31
subscribe amount and subscribe quantity for each one” and marked the
document “Attn Mr Peter Yau”.

58.  In the event, 150,150,000 placemen t shares were placed of the
184,850,000 available for subscription, raising just over $6.5 million which was
deposited by Guoyuan into the Hang Se ng Bank savings account of Sino
Katalytics on 10 February 2009.  All of the brokers identified by Mr Ben
Cheung, save for Kim Eng, participated  on behalf of the account holders he
stipulated for the respective brokers.

Mr Ben Cheung
59.  Mr Ben Cheung had first met Mr Peter Yau whilst they were at
university in Hong Kong in the period 19 87 to 1991.    Mr Ben Cheung worked
as a broker for Guotai from 2001 until the autumn of 2008.    He was involved in
Guotai’s role in the public  listing of Sino Kata lytics, as China Northern in 2003.  
He was an executive director, as was Mr Peter Yau, of Si no Katalytics from its
listing until mid-2004.    Notwithstanding  his resignation from the board of Sino
Katalytics, Mr Ben Cheung said that he  maintained his frequent social contact
with Mr Peter Yau.

60.  In early January 2009 Mr Ben  Cheung became the Deputy Chief
Executive Officer of Guoyuan.    He was res ponsible for marketing, in particular
Asset Management.    He met Mr David Hui and they discussed Mr Ben Cheung
introducing business to his new employers .    During the weekend of 10 and 11
January 2009 he raised the subject of  Sino Katalytics exploring doing business

32
with Guoyuan with Mr Peter Yau in a telephone conversation.    In light of Mr
Peter Yau’s expression of interest in pur suing that course he arranged for Mr
Peter Yau to come to the offices of Guoyuan on Monday 12  January 2009.    He
had no discussions with Mr Peter Yau in respect of the placement in their many
telephone conversations in th e period 1 to 9 January 2009.

61.  On the morning of 12 January 2009 he made arrangements with Mr
David Hui to meet Mr Peter Yau.    He in troduced them, but did not take part or
get involved with their discussions.    Th ere was no discussion between them at
which he was present in which mention was made of the price of a placement of
Sino Katalytics shares, namely at 4.5 cents , or of the size of such placement,
namely about 184 million shares.    Mr Ben Cheung had no recollection of any
discussion with Mr Peter Yau, prior  to the weekend tele phone conversation,
about Sino Katalytics doing  business with Guoyuan, in  particular by placement
of shares.    They had not discussed that issue in their many telephone calls in
the period on and between  1 and 9 January 2009.    After the meeting he had
spoken by telephone to both  Mr David Hui and Mr Peter Yau who each made
inquiries about the business of the other.

62.  Initially, Mr Ben Cheung testified th at he was not involved in the
implementation of the placement.    He ha d no role to play.    He did not contact
the placees.    Those various matters were the responsibility of Mr David Hui.  
Further, he said that he had no contact with Mr Duncan Chui in respect of the
placement.


33
63.  On being recalled to give evidence, following the provision to the
Tribunal of material from the relevant f iles maintained by Mr David Hui and on
being confronted with the handwritten  schedule in respect of the placement
detailing brokers, account executives and placees, Mr Ben Cheung resiled from
his earlier evidence.    Now,  he remembered that he had been contacted by Mr
David Hui a few days after the meeting  at which he had introduced Mr Peter
Yau and Mr David Hui.    He said that at the latter’s  request he had written out
the schedule providing that information,  in particular as to potential placees.
However, he said that he was not involved in the  follow-up resulting from his
having given that information to Mr David  Hui.    Certainly, at the time that he
had written up the handwritten schedule he  had not contacted any of the persons
named on the schedule in respect of the placement.

64.  Mr Ben Cheung then said that after he had written the schedule he
might have had contact with some of the persons then named in respect of issues
raised by them about the placement.   Acknowledging that the handwritten
schedule did not contain any contact details of Mr Tommy Lui Chun Bing (“Mr
Tommy Lui”), detailed as a  subscriber for the placement, he accepted that he
could/should have contacted him about th e placement at some time after he had
written the schedule.

65.  The telephone records of phone calls made between  telephones used
by Mr Ben Cheung and Mr Peter Yau evidence regular contact between them in
the period on and between  2 and 9 January 2009.    On the afternoon of Monday
12 January 2009 there were  no fewer than four telephone calls between them.  

34
That pattern of regular contact between them by telephone  continued in the
following days.

66.  Mr Ben Cheung said that he did not think that he had contacted Mr Li
Yiu Keung, another of the names on the schedule, prior to writing at the
schedule and had no recollection of having done so afterwards.    Similarly, he
said that he had not contacted Mr Loui s Lui Chi Lung (“Mr Louis Lui”), another
of the names on the schedule, about th e placement prior to writing out the
schedule but did not discount having done so afterwards.  The telephone
records of telephones used by Mr Ben  Cheung on the one hand and Mr Li Yiu
Keung and Mr Louis Lui respectively on the other hand evidence a pattern of
regular contact in the period on and betw een 2 and 20 January  2009, the more so
between Mr Ben Che ung and Mr Li Yiu Keung.    The latter said that Mr Ben
Cheung had drawn his attention to the placement, but he could not remember if
he done that before or after th e announcement made by the company.

67.  In January 2009, Mr Tommy Lui worked as a consultant for
Omnicorp Limited, introducing business opportunities to them.    He said that he
learned of the placement of Sino Kata lytics shares from  Mr Ben Cheung who
told him that it was a good deal: a good price at the usual discount.    When his
attention was drawn to the telephone records of conve rsations on telephones that
the two of them used, he said that  it was probably not as early as the
conversation of 2 January 2009 that he had learned of the Sino Katalytics
placement.    It was possible that it had been mentioned in the conversation of 6
January 2009, not as specific as a plac ement but as “something good coming up

35
-- would you be interested?”  Noting that  there had been th ree or four calls
between them on each of 12 and 13 January  2009, he said that he was more sure
that Mr Ben Cheung was sounding out his inte rest in terms of the amount of the
placement he would take.  Mr Tommy Lui said that being approached for
interest in a prospective placement  before the announcement by the company
was normal practice.

68.  Of the relative importance of the discounts stipulated in respect of the
shares of Sino Katalytics, namely as to  the last trading price, the average over
the last five trading days and as to  net asset value, Mr Tommy Lui said:
“all three are important, and all will be  considered, but normally, of course, you
need to have a reasonable discount, and then the asset value shows whether it, in
theory, is a good or bad sort of value.”.

69.  Mr Alex Au Wai Chi (“Mr Alex Au”), the founder and managing
director of Richland Capital, one of the placees in the Sino Katalytics placement,
said that he had had contact with Ms Icy Lau Ying (“Ms Icy Lau”) of Guotai in
connection with that placement.  However, he said that he was not sure
whether he had been contacted in advance of contact with her, to gauge his
interest in participating in the placement .  In that context, he said that his
original broker with Guotai had been Mr  Ben Cheung.    He was not sure if he
had contacted him or whether that  had been done before or after the
announcement made by a Sino Katalyti cs of its prospective placement.

70.  Mr Louis Lui said that Mr Ben Cheung has been his account manager
at Guotai.  They were in regular telephone contact in January 2009.  In

36
January 2009 he was the pe rson who made the decision  to buy Sino Katalytics
placement shares for  the account of his wife.    He could not remember if his
attention to the fact of a placement  had been drawn by the announcement itself
or whether he had been contacted by someone.

Placing letters
71.  Beginning on 20 January 2009 and in the following few days
Guoyuan sent out placing letters to the various placees, in which confirmation
was made of the oral contract between  the placee and Guoyuan for the former to
buy stipulated quantities of the placement shares.    In response, in the following
days the placees returned Forms of Acknowledgement to Guoyuan.

Placement proceeds
72.  On 10 February 2009 Guoyuan transferred the net proceeds of the
placement, $6,554,000.00 odd, to the Hang Seng Bank account of Sino
Katalytics, of which Mr Peter Yau was the signatory.    In the several days that
followed, $5.4 million was transferre d to CNI Bullion and $1 million to a
personal account of Mr Duncan Chui.

The accounts of Mr Duncan Chui and Mr Peter Yau as to the genesis and
development of the placement of Sino Katalytics shares
73.  Although Mr Duncan Chui acknow ledged that he had frequent
telephone conversations with Mr Peter Yau in th e week ending Friday, 9
January 2009, he said that he first beca me aware of a possible placement of Sino
Katalytics shares only as a result of a telephone conversatio n he had with Mr

37
Peter Yau on the evening of Sunday,  11 January 2009, in which the latter
conveyed that information to him.    He  said that he had responded by telephone
to an SMS message from Mr Peter Yau at 21:58 that evening.    Mr Peter Yau
told him that he wished to engage G uoyuan to do a placement exercise for Sino
Katalytics.

74.  In his witness statement, submitted  to the Tribunal as his evidence in
chief, he said that Mr Peter Yau had aske d if it would be “possible to apply for
suspension of trading on the following Monday”.    In cross-examination by Mr
Bernard Mak he said of Mr Peter Yau :
“ ... he was most concerned with the tim ing of the suspension of … trading, so
that was the urgency why I had to make  a call to Mr Chow and Mr Chan on the
evening of the 11
th
, to find out what was the pr oper procedure. And hence I
replied to Mr Yau that we need to ge t a placement agreement signed before we
can submit to the Stock Exchange for an application to suspend trading.”.

75.  Mr Duncan Chui explained that he was unsuccessful in contacting Mr
Alex Chow, a director of Sino Katalytics.  However, he spoke by telephone to
Mr Kasper Chan, the company secretary of Sino Katalytics,  and was advised of
the need for a signed placement agreement before an application for suspension
of trading in the shares of Sino Kata lytics could be made , which advice he
passed on to Mr Peter Yau late that evening.    Nevertheless, Mr Duncan Chui
went on to agree with Mr Bernard Mak that it was possible that Mr Peter Yau’s
enquiry was simply whether or not it was  necessary for Sino Ka talytics to seek a
suspension of trading in its shares because he was about to approach a placing
agent.  However, in cross-examination by Presenting Officer, having been
reminded that in his record of intervie w by the SFC he had said that Mr Peter

38
Yau’s enquiry was whether the shares “c ould be suspended”, Mr Duncan Chui
said that the enquiry was, “whether  suspension of trading was possible on
Monday”.

76.  Mr Duncan Chui said that Mr Alex Chow finally made contact with
him at 13:28 on Monday 12 January 2009.   Having been informed by Mr
Duncan Chui of Mr Peter Yau’s proposed placement of Sino Katalytics shares,
at Mr Alex Chow’s insistence, a board  meeting was arranged fo r 5 p.m. that day
to discuss the matter.    He was not awar e at that time that Mr Peter Yau had
already met Mr David Hui of Guoyuan to  discuss the placement that morning.

77.  Mr Peter Yau said that Mr Ben Cheung and he were long standing
friends who had conducted business with  one another over the years.  They
were in frequent contact with each other both by telephone and in person.    He
accepted that in the days leading up to the week ending Friday 9 January 2009
they were in frequent te lephone contact with one another.    Although he knew
that Mr Ben Cheung had left Guotai several months earlier he did not know of
his employment at Guoyuan until he was informed of that fact by Mr Ben
Cheung in a telephone call on either Saturday or Sunday 10/11 January 2009.  
In that conversation Mr Ben Cheung raised the prospect of business being
conducted between his new  employer and Sino Katalytic s.    Since he was now
employed in asset management  Mr Peter Yau said that he agreed to meet Mr
David Hui of Guoyuan’s ECM Department on Monday morning, “to explore the
chance of doing any business”.    He expected it to be a handshaking session.  
He knew nothing about Mr David Hui.   In cross-examination by the Presenting

39
Officer, he denied that a decision to go ahead with placement had been reached
prior to 11 January 2009, following detailed discussions with Mr Ben Cheung.

11 January 2009
78.  Mr Peter Yau accepted that there were telephone records of two
telephone calls initiated on  his telephone to Mr Ben Cheung on the evening of
11 January 2009, respectively at 8:05 p. m. and 8:25 p.m. and one call at 9:58
p.m. to Mr Duncan Chui, the last of which calls was immediately returned by
Mr Duncan Chui.    Mr Peter Yau said that he had informed Mr Duncan Chui of
his prospective meeting at Guoyuan th e following day telling him that he
proposed, “to see what can be done: it coul d be a placement.”    He said that he
had gone on to ask Mr Duncan Chui whether a suspension of trading in the
shares of Sino Katalytics was necessary.  He was not asking that it be
suspended.

12 January 2009
79.  Mr Peter Yau said that he met Mr David Hui at the offices of
Guoyuan sometime after 10 a.m. on Monday, 12 January 2009.  He did not
remember Mr Ben Cheung introducing him to Mr David Hui, although he was
present for a very short part of the meeting.    Mr David Hui suggested that the
business between them be  a placement by Sino Katalytics.    The only mention
as to the size of the placement was that  it be within the general mandate, namely
20% of the issued capital of Sino Katalytics.    There was no mention of it being
a top-up placement.    Mr David Hui proposed  that the placement price be in the
middle of the range of Sino Katalytics’s share price the previous week, namely

40
between 4 to 5 cents.    In doing so, Mr David Hui referred to a chart which he
brought up on a terminal at his desk.

Board meeting
80.  The board meeting convened at  5 p.m. on 12 January 2009 was
conducted by way of telephone, Mr Duncan Chui and  Mr Peter Yau being in
their respective offices.  Mr Duncan Chui said that Mr Peter Yau led the
discussion, informing the board that Mr Ben Cheung, who had recently moved
to Guoyuan, had said that Guoyuan  wanted to do a placement for Sino
Katalytics.    Mr Duncan Chui agreed that Sino Katalytics wa s “low on cash” at
that time, but said that he did not think  that “we had to panic because of the low
working capital”.  Of the issue of ‘panic’, he said that the company had
outstanding loans that could be recalled and listed equitie s that could be
liquidated.

81.  Mr Duncan Chui said that there was no “specific discussion on the use
of proceeds” at the board meeting.    There was no dispute that on receipt of the
monies in the Hang Seng bank account  of Sino Katalytics in  early February
2009 within days, $5.4 million was transferred to the account of CNI Bullion
and $1 million to the account of Mr Duncan Chui.    He said that, although it
was not recorded in the board minutes, “ ... there was no objection from the
directors that the money ought to be us ed for Bullion capital requirement”.    For
his part, he “asked the board ... to reimburse the money that I advanced to the
company recently.”


41
82.  For his part, Mr Peter Yau said that shortly after his meeting with Mr
David Hui the latter had faxed him a letter in wh ich Guoyuan agreed to act as
placing agent for Sino Katalytics.    However, no draft placing agreement was
available at the board meeting held at  5 p.m. that day.    There was no dispute
that the board minutes, which were compile d some weeks later, were inaccurate
as to the assertion to the contrary.

83.  The initial draft placement agreements received by Mr Peter Yau on
the evening of 12 January 2009 provided fo r a top-up placement in which he and
Mr Duncan Chui participated in broadly similar volume of shares.    He said that
he did not know why it was that Mr David Hui had instructed his solicitor to
draft the agreement in that form.    He had not agreed to a placement in the form.

84.  Mr Duncan Chui said that he had a telephone conversation with Mr
David Hui that evening in which they discussed the proposed top-up placement
exercise.    He told Mr David Hui that he was not prepared to participate in a
top-up placement.    Since neither Mr Peter Yau or Mr Duncan Chui agreed to
proceed with those agreements, a single new share placement agreement, which
both signed, was produced on the  afternoon of 13 January 2009.

85.  Mr Duncan Chui said that after the single placement agreement was
made:
“his involvement in the placement was lim ited. I left it to Sarah and Kasper to
complete the process and the documentation.”.



42
The securing of placees
86.  Mr Peter Yau said that he knew Mr Louis Lui,  Mr Tommy Lui and Mr
Li Yiu Keung, but that he had not contacted  them to subscribe to the placement.  
There was no dispute that they were associated with the huge majority of the
placed shares.    Having been reminded of the evidence of Mr David Hui and Mr
Ben Cheung in respect of the hand written list of placees, written out by Mr Ben
Cheung and given to Mr David Hui, Mr Peter Yau responded to the suggestion
that it was Mr Ben Cheung who was actually assisting in implementing the deal
by saying that he had no idea what ha ppened between Mr Ben Cheung and Mr
David Hui.    Of the evidence of dir ect contact by telephone between Mr Ben
Cheung and various placees, in the period leading up to the agreement of the
placees to participate in the placement, Mr Peter Yau said that it was possible
that “David Hui find that he was unable to cope with it, and seek assistance from
Ben Cheung”.

Ms Chan Wai Yan
87.  Mr Peter Yau confirmed that Ms  Chan Wai Yan had been employed
as the marketing and sa les manager of CNI Bullio n since 2007.  Of her
purchase of 350,000 Sino Katalytics shares at 5.4 cents per share at 16:06 12
January 2009, which had the  effect of raising the closing price to 5.4 cents from
5.0 cents per share, he denied having me ntioned to her that Sino Katalytics was
going to place shares.

43
CHAPTER 4
A CONSIDERATION OF THE MATERIAL RECEIVED

88.  From the outset of the proceedings the Tribunal had been invited to
examine the juxtaposition of two different  events, namely trading in the shares
of Sino Katalytics on 9 January 2009 be tween Mr Duncan Chui and Mr Peter
Yau and the subsequent placement of sh ares by Sino Katalytics, in respect of
which the company entered a placement agreement on 13 January 2009 with
Guoyuan which fact was described in the comp any’s announcement of 15
January 2009.    At issue, is whether or  not the two events were linked.    Did the
trading between the two men have the e ffect of creating a false or misleading
appearance with respect to the price fo r dealing in Sino Katalytics shares?    Was
their trading done with that intention or  were they reckless as to whether it had
or was likely to have that effect?    Was  their purpose to facilitate an imminent
placement of Sino Katalytics shares, in particular at a price of 4.5 cents per share?  
Or, was the juxtaposition of the two events coincidental?  Most importantly,
was the trading of the two men genuine trading between a genuine seller and a
genuine buyer?

Expert evidence
89.  Although the Tribunal received the re ports and oral evidence of Mr
Eric Cheng and Mr Richard Witts as expert witnesses, with no disrespect to
them, they have been of limited assist ance to the Tribunal in determining the
material matters at issue.    As is apparent from the identification of the material
matters at issue in this report almost all of them are issues that lie squarely

44
within the domain of the Tribunal and do  not require the assistance of expert
evidence.    There is no dispute that Sino Katalytics shares traded at a substantial
discount to net asset value.    Mr Duncan  Chui’s explanation for his trading in
Sino Katalytics shares on 9 January 2009 is a matter for the Tribunal to accept
or not.    It is not an area in which Tribun al is assisted by expert evidence.    On
the other hand, the Tribunal has been a ssisted by the provision of statistical
information, in particular as to trading in Sino Katalytics shares.

90.  We regret to say that Mr Eric Cheng’s report en croached on many
areas outwith the province of an expert.    He expressed opinions on matters that
are not the business of an expert.    As  a result, the Tribunal was prepared to
receive his report only in edited form.  Inevitably, in his report Mr Richard
Witts was drawn into responding to areas in which Mr Eric Cheng ought not to
have expressed opinions.    The observations of Gleeson NPJ as to the role of an
expert in his judgment in the Court of Final Appeal in  Fu Kor Kuen Patrick &
Another v HKSAR  (FACC No. 4 of 2011unreported May 2012 at paragraphs
25-27) are apposite.

91.  There is no dispute that trading between Mr Duncan Chui, as buyer,
and Mr Peter Yau, as seller, in the last 20 minutes or so of trading on 9 January
2009 resulted in a sharp rise in the price at which Sino Kata lytics shares were
bought and sold on 9 January and provide d the closing price of 5.5 cents per
share.  There were two only previous transactions that day, namely sales of
50,000 and 500,000 Sino Katalytics shares at  4.2 cents and 4.4 cents per share.  
The closing price of Sino Katalytics sh ares on 8 January 2009 was 4.2 cents per

45
share.    That had been the closing price on the two trading days, whereas on 5
January 2009 it had closed at 4.1 cents per share.    4.2 cents per share was the
‘High’ in trading on those four previous trading days.

92.  As noted earlier, the huge majority of the proceeds of about $6.5
million received by Sino Katalytics from the placemen t of its shares was
dispersed to CNI Bullion ($5.4 million)  and Mr Duncan Chui personally ($1
million).    Although an associate company of Sino Katalytics, CNI Bullion was
run by Mr Peter Yau.    The payment to  Mr Duncan Chui was the repayment of
monies advanced by him to Sino Katalytics, whereas  the monies advanced to
CNI Bullion were used in its various businesses.    Clearly, the placement was of
mutual benefit to them.

93.  There is no doubt that Mr Ben Cheung played a crucial role in the
genesis of the placement and in bringing  it to fruition.    We are satisfied that in
evidence he downplayed that role, only reluctantly accepting that he actually
played a greater role when confronted by contemporary records or other
evidence.   He was an unreliable and untruthful witness.  Although he knew
and was known to both Mr Duncan Chui  and Mr Peter Yau a nd had contact with
each of them, in the material period  prior to the trading between them on 9
January 2009, that day itself and in th e period up until the placing agreements
were signed in late January 2009 by far the greater c ontact was with Mr Peter
Yau.


46
94.  It is clear, and we so find, that  on 12 January 2009 Mr David Hui did
not negotiate the terms of a placement with Mr Peter Yau, rather he was
presented with the deal by Mr Ben Cheung and Mr Peter Yau.  No doubt,
ultimate approval lay elsewh ere within Guoyuan.  Price  was not negotiated, it
was stipulated by Mr Peter Yau as being 4.5 cents per share.  Perhaps, Mr
David Hui was prepared to play that role because he was a novice in the field of
placements and the deal was to be done on a ‘best efforts’, no cost basis to
Guoyuan basis.    The flurry of telephone calls between Mr Ben Cheung and Mr
Peter Yau that day speaks eloquently as to  whom were the drivers of the deal.  
The fact that Mr David Hui did nothing whatsoever to find placees after the
signing of the placement agreement on 13 January 2009 until he approached Mr
Ben Cheung for him to do so is further  evidence that all concerned looked to
him to bring the placement to fruition.    Clearly, the benefit to Mr Ben Cheung
was that at the outset of his employment he was able to demonstrate his ability
to deliver business to his employer.

95.  Whilst it is clear that Mr Ben Cheung played a crucial role in
providing Mr David Hui on 14/15 January  2009 with the list and contact details
of the persons, most of whom subscribed to or arranged for others to subscribe
to the placement, and that he had contact ed some of them in respect of the
placement, it is unclear as to when he  first sounded out those placees for their
interest in participating in the placement.     Certainly, there is no direct evidence
that he did so on or before 9 January  2009.    The fact that on 14/15 January
2009 Mr Ben Cheung was able to provide a schedule of potential placees to Mr
David Hui immediately, without making  any telephone call  or other contacts

47
with people, suggests strongly that contact with those placees had been made
prior to that event.    However, it is to  be remembered that tr ading in the shares
of Sino Katalytics had been suspended in the morning of 13 January 2009 and
the market had been informed that was  pending an announcement in relation to a
top-up placing.

96.  Mr Duncan Chui’s evidence was that he first learnt of any prospective
placement of Sino Katalytics shares  from Mr Peter Yau in a telephone
conversation at 21:58 on Sunday, 11 Janua ry 2009.    Whether or not that was
the first time that he had learnt of that matter it is clear from his subsequent
conduct that he sprang into action immediat ely: firstly, in attempting to contact
Mr Alex Chow, the third executive director of Sino  Katalytics and, secondly in
contacting Mr Kasper Chan, the company  secretary, soon thereafter at 22:31.

97.  Mr Kasper Chan said that he had learned of the proposed placement
from Mr Duncan Chui in this telephone  conversation.  Mr Duncan Chui had
asked him if there was a need to apply to suspend trading in the company’s
shares.  For his part, he had told him that it was necessary for a placing
agreement to be signed befo re arrangements could be  made for a suspension of
trading in the shares.    It is to be noted  that there were tw o subsequent telephone
calls from Mr Duncan Chui to Mr Kasper Chan 23:03 and 23:55.    Immediately
before the last telephone  call between them, there  were two telephone calls
between Mr Duncan Chui and Mr Peter Yau.


48
98.  The flurry of late night telephone  calls on a Sunday between two of
the company’s directors and between one of them and the company secretary is
supportive of Mr Duncan Chui’s evid ence that the matter required a degree of
urgency in its resolution.    We accept th e ultimate thrust of Mr Duncan Chui’s
evidence, namely that the nub of Mr Peter Yau’s request  was aimed at the
‘possibility’, not the need for, having trading in the shares of Sino Katalytics
suspended the following day.

99.  The question posed by Mr Peter Ya u was: could it be done?  In
context, the fact that he raised the question in that way is to be viewed against
the rise in the price at which Sino Katalytics shares were traded in his sales in
the last 20 minutes of 9 January 2009 and the resulting closing price of 5.5 cents.  
If trading in the shares was suspended  before the market opened on Monday, 12
January 2009 it was beyond  per adventure  that the last trading day would be
taken as 9 January 2009.    If it was not  suspended in that way, the possibility
was that another subsequent day would be  taken as the last trading day with
perhaps a different closing price.

100.   Although it is clear on Mr David Hui’s evidence that the approach by
Mr Peter Yau and Mr Ben Cheung to him, as head of ECM of Guoyuan, was not
made until the morning of 12 January 2009, it is necessary to consider whether
the trading between Mr Duncan Chui and  Mr Peter Yau in the last 20 minutes or
so of trading on 9 January 2009 was done so that the closing price of Sino
Katalytics shares was inflated with the  purpose that an approach could be made

49
then to Guoyuan for their agreement to a  placement at a discount to the closing
price on the last trading day, but nevertheless at 4.5 cents per share.

101.   The nub of Mr Duncan Chui’s e xplanation for his purchases of
millions of Sino Katalytics shares on 9 January 2009 is twofold: first, that the
shares were good value and second, that  he wished to buy shares from Mr Peter
Yau to increase the overall percentage of  his shareholding in the company at the
same time as reducing that of Mr Peter Yau.

102.   One puzzling feature of Mr Duncan Chui’s explanation is that, if he
was motivated to purchase the shares because they were good value, in order to
do so he paid a significantly higher price than Mr Peter Yau paid in his
acquisition of millions of shares just a  few days earlier, in the period on and
between 2 to 6 January 2009.     If Mr Duncan Chui thought the shares such good
value why did he not buy the shares in that period?    Clearly, there were ready
sellers at a lower price than on 9 Janua ry 2009.    Or, if he was so motivated,
why had he not bought shares earlier, for example in the last week of December
2008, when over 8 million shares were sold at a much lower price than he paid
on 9 January 2009?    If good value of the shares was a driving force for Mr
Duncan Chui’s purchases on 9 January 2009, having bought 4.75 million Sino
Katalytics shares on 7 and 8 January 2009 in the range of  4.1-4.2 cents per share,
why was he prepared to buy  Mr Peter Yau’s shares in the much higher range of
4.9-5.5 cents per share?


50
103.   Mr Duncan Chui’s professed anxiety at the relationship between the
percentage of his shareholding and that of Mr Peter Yau of Sino Katalytics
shares is equally puzzling.    On 9 January 2009, prior to buying any shares, Mr
Duncan Chui held about double the number of shares than Mr Peter Yau.    The
percentage change in their shareholding, resulting from the purchases by the one
and the sales by the other that day,  was small in that Mr Peter Yau’s
shareholding fell from 12.60% to 11.75% a nd that of Mr Duncan Chui rose to
24.48% from 23.89%.  Clearly, both before and after 9 January 2009, Mr
Duncan Chui held a commanding shareholding of Sino Katalytics shares
compared with that of Mr Peter Yau.    Furthermore, since their off-market trade
at the end of August 2008, when Mr Duncan Chui acquired 55 million shares
from Mr Peter Yau, Mr Dun can Chui had always held substantially more shares
than Mr Peter Yau’s 12.6% shareholding.    Thereafter, the percentage of shares
held by Mr Peter Yau never varied by more than 1%.

104.   In the result, we reject Mr Duncan  Chui’s explanation for his purchase
of Sino Katalytics shares on 9 January 2009.

105.   Although margin calls were made by Mr Lawrence Hung of Quam
Securities of Mr Peter Yau on 6 and 8 January 2009 and earlier,   nevertheless it
is clear that they were polite requests fo r payments of modest sums of money,
which he had been able to manage on a regular ba sis by making payments of
some, rather than all, of the amount s requested.  There was nothing in the
demand of 8 January 2009 which was any di fferent to earlier demands.    He was
not being “dunned very hard”.    We reject his evidence that his indebtedness to

51
Quam Securities, in the context of those earlier margin calls, played a part in his
sale of Sino Katalytics shares in th at account on 9 January 2009.  That
indebtedness was merely $154,558.88. It is  to be noted that as a result of
purchases of Sino Katalytics shares on between 19 and  22 January 2009 his
indebtedness to Quam Securities at the end of the month was about $130,000.

106.   In any event, we are satisfied that  Mr Peter Yau had ready access to
monies with which to satisfy the mode st margin call made by Quam Securities
or with which to repay all his indebt edness to them.  Not only did he have
monies and shares in his own accounts but we are satisfied that he had a
significant interest in the account in the name of Mr Terence Hui with Quam
Securities.    Cheques drawn on Mr Peter  Yau’s bank account were used to make
payment for the purchase of shares in th e account in the name of Mr Terence
Hui.    Conversely, monies from the latter account were transferred to Mr Peter
Yau’s account.  We accept Mr Terence Hui’s evidence that he handed over
control of the operation of the account in his name.    We reject Mr Lawrence
Hung’s evidence that he received instructions from Mr Terence Hui in respect of
all trades in that account.    Having regard to all the evidence , in particular the
fact that Mr Lawrence  Hung received telephone calls from Mr Peter Yau
immediately before and after the sale of 1 million Sino Katalytics shares in that
account at 10:15:49 on 13 January 2009, we are satisfied that the instructions to
sell came from Mr Peter Yau.    Similarly, given the timing of the sale, about 30
minutes before suspension of trading in the shares, we are satisfied that the
purpose of the sale was to maintain the  trading price prior to suspension at 5.4
cents per share.

52

107.   We do not accept that Ms Chan  Wai Yan’s purchase of 350,000 Sino
Katalytics shares at 5.4 cents per share just prior to the close of trading on 12
January 2009 was coincidental or unrelated  to the fact that Mr Peter Ya u was her
‘boss’.    Her evidence that she had placed that order earlier in the day and that it
was matched after 4:00 p.m.  was untrue.    Her purchase lifted the price of the
last trade from 4.9 cents to 5.4 cents, which price was the closing price.    We
reject her evidence that her trade was not  known or disclosed to  Mr Peter Yau.  
We are satisfied that Mr Peter Yau had a hand in  her purchase, in particular that
he was instrumental in causing her to make that purchase.

108.   Having rejected the accounts of bot h Mr Duncan Chui and Mr Peter
Yau in respect of their respective purchases and sales of Sino Katalytics shares
on 9 January 2009 we turn to consider why those trades occurred.  Was it
coincidence that 97.2% of the Sino Kataly tics shares bought by Mr Duncan Chui
were sold to him by Mr Peter Yau?  Was it significant that those trades
occurred in the last 20 minutes or so trading that day?    Why did Mr Duncan
Chui buy those shares at such a significantly increased price than he had bought
shares in the previous two days?    Was th e fact that the trading between the two
men raised the closing price of Sino Katalytics shares 30.95% above its closing
price on 8 January 2009 connected with the  suspension of trading in their shares
pending a placement announced by Sino Katalytics on 13 January 2009?

109.   For his part, Mr Duncan Chui accep ted that he guessed or understood
that the seller from whom he bought shares  in that period of trading at the end of

53
9 January 2009 was Mr Peter Yau.    Indeed, he said that was one of the two
driving motives for those purchases.   Not only was he buying good value
shares but also he was buying from Mr  Peter Yau and therefore increasing the
difference between the percentage shareh olding each had in the company in his
favour.    Mr Peter Yau said that he did not know to whom he was selling.    We
reject that evidence.  We are satisfi ed that each knew with whom he was
trading.  Each was trying to trade with the other.    Similarly, we are satisfied
that the sharp increase in the price in  which shares were traded between them
and the only earlier trade (4.2 cents per sh are) and their initial trade (4.9 cents
per share) and their final trade (5.5 cen ts per share) was because it was arranged
between them that they would drive up th e price at which Sino Katalytics shares
were traded so that the closing price woul d be increased, as it was.    That is why
they traded in the last 20 minutes or so  of the trading day.    Similarly, that is
why the trading occurred in the last 20 minutes of the last trading day of the
week.  Having secured the desired in crease in the closing price of Sino
Katalytics shares the weekend afforded a period of time in which the closing
price would remain unchanged in whic h arrangements coul d be pursued in
respect of the placement that was announ ced the following trading week.    They
were not trading as genuine buyers and sellers.

False trading: section 274
110.   We are satisfied that each of them intended that their trading in Sino
Katalytics shares in the last 20 minutes or so of trading on 9 January 2009 have
the effect of creating a false or misleading appearance with respect to the price
for dealing in Sino Katalytics shares.    A lternatively, each of them was reckless

54
as to whether it had or was likely to have that effect.  Furthermore, we are
satisfied that each of them took part in  that trading with the intention of creating
an artificial price for dealings in Sino  Katalytics shares, namely the price set by
the forces of genuine demand and supply .  Alternatively, each of them was
reckless as to whether their trading had the effect of creating an artificial price
for dealings in Sino Katalytics shares.    Accordingly, we are satisfied that they
are each culpable of false trading, contrary to section 274(1)(b) and (3) of the
Ordinance.

Price rigging: section 275
111.   In reaching that determination, the  Tribunal has not had regard to or
relied on section 274(5) of the Ordinance.     The Chairman accepted Mr Bernard
Mak’s submission, made on behalf of Mr Peter Yau, and directed the Tribunal
that neither he nor Mr Peter Yau were ‘associates’ of each other, as defined in
section 245(1) of the Ordinance.

112.   We are satisfied that in trading with each other in the material period
on 9 January 2009 Mr Duncan  Chui and Mr Peter Yau en tered into and carried
out artificial transactions with the inten tion that the trading had the effect of
increasing the price of Sino Katalytics sh ares traded on the Stock Exchange of
Hong Kong.    The trading constituted artificial transactions because they were
not genuine buyers and sellers in that  the resulting increase price of Sino
Katalytics shares did not reflect the fo rces of genuine supply and demand.
Alternatively, each of them was reckless as to whether it had that effect.    In
reaching that determination, we had rega rd to the provisions of section 275(4),

55
and were satisfied that neither of th em had established that the purpose for
which they bought and sold Sino Katalytics shares respectively was not or did
not include the purpose of creating a false or misleading appearance with respect
to the price of Sino Katalytics shares.

113.   Accordingly, we are satisfied that each of them was culpable of price
rigging, contrary to section 275(1)(b) of the Ordinance.

Stock market manipulation: section 278
114.   As noted earlier, in the period of  around 20 minutes at the end of the
trading day on 9 January 2009 no less than eight transactions, purchases and
sales of tranches of Sino Katalytics shares, were made betwee n Mr Duncan Chui
and Mr Peter Yau.    Having begun with a  trade of 1 million shares at 4.9 cents
per share, they concluded w ith a sale of 800,000 shares  at 5.5 cents per share.
They intended to trade with each other.    Clearly, the trading had the effect of
increasing the price at which those shares  were traded on the stock market.    As
noted earlier, we have found that it was th eir intention to increase the price of
Sino Katalytics shares by their trading, in  particular to achieve a higher closing
price than had obtained the previous day or in that day of trading.  They
pursued that pattern of trading intending by its success to launch a placement of
Sino Katalytics shares in the market.    Their intention, in so trading with each
other with the effect of increasing the price at which the shar es were traded, was
to induce others to subscribe in the placement of those shar es.    They knew and
anticipated that the placement shares would be offered at a discount to the last
traded price.    Accordingly, we are satis fied that Mr Duncan Chui and Mr Peter

56
Yau are culpable of stock market manipulation, contrary to section 278(1)(a) of
the Ordinance.

Friday, June 29, 2012

「避險天才」預期大衰退 Michael Burry,1971 /// Michael Lewis


2012年6月29日

「避險天才」預期大衰退

對沖基金Greenlight Capital創辦人艾因霍恩(David Einhorn)2002年5月透露,分析發現投資機構Allied Capital賬目不合邏輯,Greenlight因此已拋空Allied股票,導致翌日Allied股價急挫並一度停牌,亦為艾因霍恩引致Allied 透過證交會SEC的長期找麻煩報復(詳見2010年12月21日信研「Long Short王投資回顧前瞻」);但艾因霍恩惹來的麻煩相比另一位年輕投資才俊只算是雞毛蒜皮小事,2010年4月3日,《紐約時報》一篇質詢聯儲局眼光的 文章竟為作者引來幾個政府部門的圍攻。
加州大學洛杉磯分校(UCLA)經濟系今年6月中旬舉行的畢業禮邀請了米高.布利(Michael Burry,1971)為主要致辭嘉賓。典禮主持人介紹說,米高1993年在UCLA經濟系畢業後,到Vanderbilt University School of Medicine考取醫生資格,然後在Stanford University Hospital作為神經學(neurology)實習醫生期間離開醫學界重返經濟專業,他在2000年創立對沖基金Scion Capital時,米高醫生已是卓有名望的揀股高手。
英女皇在金融危機爆發約一年半後造訪LSE(倫敦政治經濟學院)時問道,為什麼沒有人 預測到危機的發生?主持人不無驕傲地表示,英女皇應該來UCLA訪問,因為米高憑他眼光獨到的分析,預見了美國金融和房地產市場的崩潰,以及AIG、房利 美、房貸美、Countrywide Financial、華盛頓互惠等的破產危機,名作家路易斯(Michael Lewis)的銷書The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine(2010年3月)便記述了米高的故事。
路易斯的生花妙筆可以將 不同階段零碎的真人真事(部分可能枯燥無味)貫串起來,編寫成小說般吸引人一讀即不能釋手,他較早期的作品Liar's Poker(1989)已被推許為華爾街必讀之選;在路易斯筆下:布利未到兩歲便患上一種罕見的癌症,手術雖然成功切除腫瘤,但亦令他失去了左眼,一個裝 上玻璃眼珠的小孩子少不免會成為玩伴嘲弄的對象,也可能由此養成布利慣於離群自學不擅於社交的性格(布利成年後確實被診斷有亞斯伯格症Asperger Syndrome,亞斯伯格症臨床特徵與自閉症有很多相似之處,例如社交技巧缺陷,又例如對某些事物具有超越一般人的興趣);布利亦承認,他對於個別事物 一是全無興趣,一是如着魔般苦心鑽研,因此他才會選讀經濟以至醫學等高深複雜科目。
在Stanford醫學院實習的1990年代後期,布利 迷上了電腦,並利用電腦研究股市,目的可能為了驗證他父親的評語是否確實無誤──布利讀中學時他父親曾指着一份報章的股價表說,股市根本是一個騙局。布利 首先從殿堂級大師格拉罕(Benjamin Graham)的價值投資學習股票知識,再研究格拉罕的得意弟子、當代股壇巨星畢非德的投資心得和買賣股票法門,愈深入研究,布利發現愈不可能單靠一些投 資原則便可以複製成為另一個畢非德。
創立獨特風格
他亦豁然省悞,師承格拉罕的畢非德,也並不全盤照抄格拉罕的一套而別闢蹊徑創立自己的個人獨特風格;布利在醫院輪班工作16小時之餘抽空開blog發表股評,又公開他經過仔細分析認為值得買入的股票,並上載他的投資成績表。
布 利在網上的「無心插柳」很快便引起華爾街專業人士的注意,一位基金經理表示:「這傢伙只是一個見習醫生……他在科網股泡沫中實踐價值投資……我們都輸錢, 又流失客戶,他的成績單卻增長50%……這個神秘超人……不單止我們在看着……他的模式是見人所未見。」事實上,布利發現他的blog網訪客包括富達互惠 基金和華爾街大行摩根士丹利,他甚至懷疑有華爾街基金經理跟隨他的投資組合買賣。2000年,布利離開Stanford籌組自己的基金,當其時他全副身家 只有4萬美元,即使加上母親和三位兄弟投他信心一票的3萬美元,合起來還不夠他的教育貸款債務14.5萬美元的一半,但心懷大志的布利卻宣傳若要投資他的 基金,客戶最少需擁有1500萬美元資產──布利和他認識的所有朋友都沒有資格成為基金投資者的條件。
意想不到的是,布利在捉襟見肘的窘境 (租辦公室、購買家具等在在需財)中接到兩個電話:首先是紐約的大型投資基金Gotham Capital創辦人Joel Greenblatt,Greenblatt不少職員坦承根據布利的推薦一直賺錢,因此Greenblatt提出用1百萬美元買入布利基金的四分之一股 權;第二個電話來自保險公司White Mountain的Kip Oberting(後來Oberting創辦基金公司KVO Capital Management,金融危機後,Oberting形容布利是「避險機」a risk-avoider),Oberting一直留意布利的一舉一動,他準備從White Mountain投資的一隻基金抽調60萬美元支持布利,並承諾將加注1千萬美元;布利的Scion Capital於是順利開業。
炒作次按CDS
布利亦沒有令他的投資者失望,Scion頭三年分別取得55%、16%、50%投資回報,而同期2001至2003年標普500指數分別下跌11.8%、22.1%和28.6%;2005年中,當大圍股市指數下跌6.84%,布利的基金卻增長242%。
但 布利的最得意傑作是在2005年決定不再投資股票,轉為專注炒作次按有關例如CDS衍生工具,原因是他分析發現房貸按揭市場很多不正常現象:房價升幅大大 偏離家庭收入曲線、無入息人士也可以借錢買樓、評級機構的信貸評級標準混亂,最令人吃驚的是業主可以自訂按揭還款方式,銀行甚至接受按揭首兩年不需還本也 不需付息……等等的典型泡沫迹象,他預期房地產泡沫最遲在兩年後即2007年大部分按揭重訂條款時爆破。布利分別要求大型投行例如高盛和大摩就次按的 CDS開價,當時根本沒有人認為升勢如火如荼的房價會掉頭下跌,他成功以低得後來證明難以置信的價錢分批買入大量次按CDS。有趣的是,在房地產泡沫爆破 前,布利先後接到多間投行的電話希望「回購」早年售出的次按CDS。
美國的房地產泡沫結果已寫在牆上,但不擅於交際的布利在泡沫爆破之前曾 面對不少客戶批評他「不務正業」,由最拿手的股市轉而投入一些例如ABS、CDS、Alt-A、RMBS等等讓人聽到一頭霧水的衍生產品市場,很多客戶若 不是受基金條款所限早已撤資(布利要求投資他的基金一般在兩年內不可以退出)。而布利感到「心灰意冷」的是,房地產泡沫一如預期爆破之後,先前威脅贖回基 金現在賺大錢的客戶,沒有一個人讚他當年作出正確的決定,更不要提誠意道歉。布利於2008年結束了Scion。
布利在UCLA除了再次解 釋他預見房地產泡沫不能持續的理據,並透露他2010年4月3日在《紐約時報》以I Saw the Crisis Coming, Why Didn’t the Fed? 為題回應聯儲局前主席格林斯平發言的文章刊出後兩個星期,政府派人審核他所有6個早已停止運作的基金;然後國會金融危機調查組要求他提交全部電郵記錄,和 2003年以來曾經與他通話的所有人的名單;沒多久,聯邦調查局有人找上門來。政府花費大量人力財力只因為他問了一條有損聯儲局尊嚴的問題。
布 利表示,美國房地產泡沫及金融危機並不是「黑天鵝」而是可預測和有辦法防止的,但聯儲局故步自封,用過時的經濟理論處理現代的金融市場問題,後果不問而 知。布利提醒他的學弟學妹說,金融危機的影響尚未成為過去,而貝南奇仍固執地沿用失效的舊邏輯,加上美國債務總額超過GDP的200%的新危機種子,他忠 告UCLA應屆畢業生好好準備,在他們的年代將要面對另一次大衰退。
策劃:信報研究部
撰文:徐天任


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Monday, December 19, 2011

How the iPhone widens the US trade deficit with China

How the iPhone widens the US trade deficit with China
http://voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/6335


Yuqing Xing
10 April 2011

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Comment Republish

What can the iPhone tell us about the trade imbalance between China and the US? This column argues that current trade statistics greatly inflate the value of China’s iPhone exports to the US, since China's value added accounts for only a very small portion of the Apple product's price. Given this, the renminbi’s appreciation would have little impact on the global demand for products assembled in China.

At the centre of global imbalances is the bilateral trade imbalance between China and the US. Most attention to date has been focused on macro factors and China’s exchange-rate regime. Little attention, however, has been paid to the structural factors of economies and global production networks that have reversed conventional trade patterns, transformed the implications of trade statistics and weakened the effectiveness of exchange rates on trade balances.

Today’s trade is not that experienced by the British economist David Ricardo two hundred years ago (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2008). It is almost impossible to define clearly where a manufactured product is made in the global market. This is why on the back of an iPhone one can read “Designed by Apple in California, Assembled in China”. In this column, I use the smartphone in your pocket to argue that current trade statistics have distorted the reality of the Sino-US trade imbalance and the appreciation of the renminbi would have little impact on the imbalance.
How iPhones are produced

The iPhone is designed and marketed by Apple. Apart from its software and product design, the production of iPhones primarily takes place outside of the US. Manufacturing iPhones involves nine companies, which are located in China, South Korea, Japan, Germany and the US (Table 1). All iPhone components produced by these companies are shipped to Foxconn, a Taiwanese company located in China, for assembly into final products and then exported to the US and the rest of the world.

By any definition, the iPhone belongs to high-tech products, where the US has an indisputable comparative advantage and China does not domestically produce any products that could compete with it. However, the iPhone trade pattern is not what is predicted by either the Ricardian comparative advantage theory or the Heckscher-Ohlin theory. The manufacturing process of the iPhone illustrates how the global production network functions, why a developing country such as China can export high-tech goods, and why the US, the country that invented the iPhone, becomes an importer.

Table 1. Apple iPhone 3G’s major components and cost drivers

Manufacturer

Component

Cost
Toshiba (Japan)

Flash Memory

$24
Display Module

$19.25
Touch Screen

$16.00
Samsung (Korea)

Application Processor

$14.46
SDRAM-Mobile DDR

$8.50
Infineon (Germany)

Baseband

$13.00
Camera Module

$9.55
RF Transceiver

$2.80
GPS Receiver

$2.25
Power IC RF Function

$1.25
Broadcom (USA)

Bluetooth/FM/WLAN

$5.95
Numonyx (USA)

Memory MCP

$3.65
Murata (Japan)

FEM

$1.35
Dialog Semiconductor (Germany)

Power IC Application Processor Function

$1.30
Cirrus Logic (USA)

Audio Codec

$1.15
Rest of Bill of Materials

$48.00
Total Bill of Materials

$172.46
Manufacturing costs

$6.50
Grand Total

$178.96

Source: Rassweiler (2009)
iPhones and the Sino-US trade imbalance

The shipment of the ready-to-use iPhones from China to the US is recorded as China’s exports to the US. Using the total manufacturing cost $178.96 as the price of the iPhone, China’s iPhone exports to the US amounted $2.0 billion in 2009. Assuming that the parts supplied by Broadcom, Numonyx and Cirrus Logic, valued at $121.5 million, were imported from the US the iPhone alone contributed $1.9 billion trade deficit to the US, about 0.8% of the US trade deficit with China (Table 2).

On the other hand, most of the export value and the deficit due to the iPhone are attributed to imported parts and components from the third countries and have nothing to do with China. Chinese workers simply put all these parts and components together and contributed only $6.50 to each iPhone, about 3.6% of the total manufacturing cost (e.g. the shipping price). The traditional way of measuring trade credits all $178.98 to China when an iPhone is shipped to the US, thus exaggerating the export volume as well as the imbalance. Decomposing the value added along the value chain of the iPhone manufacturing suggest that, of the $2.0 billion iPhone export from China, 96.4% is actually the transfer from Germany ($326 million), Japan ($670 million), Korea($259 million), the US ($108 million) and others ($ 542 million). All of these countries are involved in the iPhone production chain.

If China’s iPhone exports were calculated based on the value added, i.e., the assembling cost, the export value as well as the trade deficit in the iPhone would be much smaller, at only $73 million, just 3.6% of the $2.0 billion calculated with the prevailing method (Table 2). The sharp contrast of the two different measurements indicates that conventional trade statistics are inconsistent with trade where global production networks and production fragmentation determine cross-country flows of parts, components, and final products. The traditional method of recording trade has failed to reflect the actual value chain distribution and painted a distorted picture about the bilateral trade relations. The Sino-US bilateral trade imbalance has been greatly inflated.

Table 2. iPhone trade and the US trade deficit with China

Year

2007

2008

2009
iPhone Sales in the US* (million Units)

3.0

5.3

11.3
Shipping Price/unit**
(the US dollar)

229

174

179
China’s Export to the US in iPhone (million US dollar)

687

922.2

2,022.7
China’s Trade Surplus with the US in iPhones

N/A

N/A

1,901.2[1]
China’s iPhone exports to the US based on value added ( million US dollar)

19.5

34.35

73.45
Value added / total exports

2.8%

3.7%

3.6%
China’s trade surplus with the US in iPhones based on value added

N/A

N/A

73.45[2]

Sources: * Hughes (2010); ** Rassweiler (2009)
[1] When calculating trade deficits between PRC and the US in iPhones, we assume that all parts supplied by Broadcom and Numunyx were imported from the US.
[2] The parts provided by Broadcom and Numunyx are shipped back to the US within the ready-to-use iPhones. They are “round tripping” exports, which should not be considered as actual exports in the value-added approach.
iPhone trade and the appreciation of the renminbi

Many believe that appreciation of the renminbi would be an effective means to solve the Sino-US trade imbalance. Appreciation proponents ignore the fact that the appreciation can only affect a small portion of the cost of made/assembled-in-China products. If the renminbi appreciated against the US dollar by 20%, the iPhone's assembly cost would rise to $7.80 per unit, from $6.50, and add merely $1.30 to the total manufacturing costs. This would be equivalent to a 0.73% increase in total manufacturing costs. It is doubtful that Apple would pass this $1.30 to American consumers. Even a 50% appreciation would not bring a significant change in the total manufacturing cost, as the appreciation would only affect the assembling cost. Therefore, the expected pass-though effect of the renminbi’s appreciation on the price of the iPhone would be zero and the American consumers’ demand on the iPhone would not be affected. The appreciation of the renminbi would have little impact on the Sino-US trade imbalance.
Could the iPhone be assembled in the US?

There is no doubt that US workers and firms are capable of assembling iPhones. If all iPhones were assembled in the US, the $1.9 billion trade deficit would not exist. There are two possible reasons for Apple to use China as an exclusive assembly centre for iPhones. One is competition, the other is profit maximisation.

The gross profit margin of the iPhone was 62% when the phone was launched in 2007, then rose to 64% in 2009 due to reductions in manufacturing costs (table 3). If the market were perfectly competitive, the expected profit margin would be much lower and close to its marginal cost. The surging sales and high profit margin suggest that the intensity of competition is fairly low and Apple maintains a relative monopoly position. Therefore, it is not the competition but profit maximisation that drives the iPhone’ s assembly to China.

Table 3. Profit margin of the iPhone



2007

2008

2009
Unit Price to carriers

$600

$500

$500
Unit manufacturing costs*

$229

$174.33

$178.96
Profit margin

$371

$325.67

$321.4
Profit Margin (%)

62

65

64

Sources: iSupply, and the authors’ calculations.

An interesting hypothetical scenario is one where Apple had all iPhones assembled in the US. Assuming that the wage of American workers is ten times as high as those of their Chinese counterparts, the total assembly cost would rise to $68 and total manufacturing cost would be pushed to approximately $240. Selling iPhones assembled by American workers at $500 per unit would still leave a 50% profit margin for Apple. In this hypothetical scenario, the iPhone could contribute to US exports and reduce the US trade deficit, not only with China, but also with the rest of world. More importantly, Apple would create jobs for US low-skilled workers.

In a market economy, there is nothing wrong with a firm pursuing profit maximisation. Governments should not restrict such behaviour in any way. However, corporate social responsibility has been adopted as a part of corporate values by many multinational companies, including Apple. Employing American workers to assemble iPhones may be an effective way to practice corporate social responsibility.
Concluding remarks

Due to the limitations of the data, it is not possible to outline a more detailed distribution of the iPhone’s manufacturing value chain across all countries involved. However, adding additional countries and parts into the analysis would not change the bottom line – the value added created by Chinese workers accounts for only a small portion of a ready-to-use iPhone, so current trade statistics greatly inflate the value of China’s iPhone export to the US as well as the corresponding trade imbalance. Given this, the renminbi’s appreciation would have little impact on the global demand of the products simply assembled in China.
References

Grossman, Gene M and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg (2008), “Trading Tasks: A Simple Theory of Offshoring”, American Economic Review, 98(5):1978-1997.
Hughes, N (2010), “Piper: 15.8M US iPhone sales in 2010, even without Verizon”, Apple Insider, 6 January.
Rassweiler, A (2009), “iPhone 3G S Carries $178.96 BOM and Manufacturing Cost, iSuppli Teardown Reveals”. iSuppli, 24 June.

This article may be reproduced with appropriate attribution. See Copyright (below).

Topics: Exchange rates, International trade
Tags:

China
exchange-rate policy
global imbalances
iPhone
US




Yuqing Xing
Professor of economics and the Director of Asian Economic Program at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Tokyo
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Tuesday, December 13, 2011

「硬違約」浪潮將至 - 信報網站 Kyle Bass AmeriCatalyst 2011

「硬違約」浪潮將至 - 信報網站

2011年12月13日

信報研究部 投資遠見

「硬違約」浪潮將至

歐債危機已幾可肯定必將名列2011年十大經濟新聞榜首。經合組織(OECD)預期,今年環球工 業國借貸總額增至10.4萬億美元,2012年繼續上升,OECD因此警告,明年可能爆發借貸危危機。Business Insider稱為「對沖基金超級巨星」(Hedge Fund Superstar)的巴斯(Kyle Bass)11月上旬接受AmeriCatalyst訪問亦暢論當前歐、美、日的債務困局和投資部署。

時機(timing)在於投資來可算 是成敗最重要的因素,身經百戰如索羅斯,在2000年前後的科網股熱潮,也因為太早押注科網股泡沫爆破而被迫割掉虧損;對沖基金Hayman Capital創辦人巴斯(Kyle Bass)令人佩服的是他在美國房市泡沫及希臘主權債務兩場金融危機,都能夠準確拿揑時機作出投資決定,尤其是希債危機一役,巴斯在專業投資銀行也未曾注 意到希臘隱藏債務危機的情況下,幾乎是以最低價買希臘CDS(詳見2011年10月25日信研「由次按贏到希債再…… 」)。

巴 斯去年9月在AmeriCatalyst專訪解釋美國房市泡沫的理據,今年11月9日,他再接受AmeriCatalyst訪問則大談環球主權債務問題。 巴斯在11月的Hayman Capital投資通訊(《HC通訊》)警告,環球債務已達飽和水平;他在AmeriCatalyst的訪問節目指出,由2002至2011年,環球債務 以平均每年12%的速度上升,債務總額由80萬億美元增至210萬億,GDP每年平均增幅則只有4%,而政客都在盡量拖延時間(kicking the can down the road)迴避債務問題,不過,歐洲、日本、美國等全球三大發達經濟體系的債務賬單接踵到期,今天是歐洲,明天是日本,然後輪到美國,目前(美國)政客估 計還有10年時間等待經濟復蘇,政府稅收增加便會逐步解決財政收支失衡問題,但他認為,歐洲及日本危機相繼爆發的骨牌效應,大約3至5年便蔓延到美國。歷 史每次出現信貸市場債務超越GDP的200%,都是由於國家為準備戰爭而大舉借貸,在環球沒有爆發戰爭危機的今天,全球信貸市場債務超過GDP的300% 可說前所未見。

主權債務延續性公式

他表示,量度主權債務的延續性(sustainability)或是否資不 抵債(solvency)有一條簡單的公式,即債務利息支出不可以超過政府收入10%,希臘政府就因為每年債務利息支出佔政府收入達16%而導致主權違約 危機,巴斯強調不要以為希債「削髮」50%便可以解決問題,希臘政府的資產負債表只能承擔每年4.4%的利率,但希臘兩年期債券孳息已升至100%,10 年長債孳息亦高達27%(希債孳在巴斯的訪問之後持續上升,最近希臘2年和10年債息一度升至逾150%和35%),希臘實際已經完全破產。又例如另一歐 豬大國意大利,6個月前的意大利仍是歐盟中的主要樑柱,但當10年期債券孳息由5%升到6%,多年累積下來的債務因為這僅僅1%的利息成本增加,意大利頓 時陷入財政收支失控危機;而深受債務問題困擾除了歐豬五國之外還有比利時和歐羅區第二大經濟體法國。

《HC通訊》並揭穿較早前傳媒報道 IMF準備提供6000億歐羅(7940億美元)緊急貸款,讓意大利有12至18個月緩衝期去解決債務問題只是安定人心的謠言。他表示,IMF貸款的原意 是幫助國際收支平衡(balance of payments)有問題的第三世界國家以及各成員國穩定經濟,雖然IMF貸款的核心理念是為成員解決經濟危機,但並非要為揮霍無度以致債台高築的歐洲發 達國家或日本擔當最終貸款人的角色,而根據IMF網頁資料,目前IMF可用結餘只得3850億美元,遠未足以應付謠傳的7940億美元貸款額。IMF較早 前承諾為希臘提供相等於雅典政府3,200%的SDR(特別提款權)配額,已經是開IMF自己角色的玩笑。另外,歐洲金融穩定設施(EFSF)或將來其他 類似名目的機制(歐盟就歐債問題舉行多次峰會,先是成立永久性基金ESM,12月9日結束的會議通過設立財政聯盟;巴斯有預知之能?)也無法解決歐債危 機,投資者(主要是對沖基金)對EFSF擔保的歐債風險仍有很大戒心,最近EFSF發行30億歐羅債券,由於認購不足而自己購回發行額的20%;《HC通 訊》認為EFSF只是由多個囊空如洗的國家組成的機制。

勿期望IMF做救世者

巴斯又提醒投資者莫寄望IMF或 歐洲央行會成為債務危機的救世者,也不要相信政府輕言會解決難題的說話,即使危機已迫在眉睫,政客也會告訴你一切如常,例如2008年雷曼兄弟破產前一個 星期,雷曼高級債券孳息比國庫債券超出400基點,當時的財長保爾森仍堅稱銀行體系沒有問題。《HC通訊》指出,歐洲政客們也心知傾歐盟全力也走不出債務 困境,除非容許歐洲央行開動印鈔機,為歐羅區成員印製等於18萬億美元的鈔票,但大印鈔票的後果是將歐洲推回von Havenstein時期的局面(Rudolf von Havenstein是1914至1918年世界第一次大戰期間的德國中央銀行Reichsbank行長,當時他為籌募戰爭經費而大印馬克,最後導致惡性 通脹。Rudolf von Havenstein事迹請參閱2010年3月11日信研「炮製惡性通脹的翩翩公子」)。巴斯表示從未見過「有秩序違約」(orderly default);《HC通訊》預期一幕「硬違約」(hard defaults)浪潮快將出現。

歐債危機成為今年第四季以來最熱門的財經 新聞,《HC通訊》估計日本不久將取代歐洲佔據報紙頭版,原因有二:日本是全球債務問題最嚴重的國家,公債等於政府收入的20倍,意大利、希臘都瞠乎其 後。而債務無法解開的死結是日本的人口結構,過去3年,日本的人口減少了3百萬至現在約1.28億人,由於日本是全球恐外性(xenophobic)最強 烈的發達國家,外國人要成為日本公民困難重重,全國1.28億人口之中只有1百萬並非原籍日本人。再加上全國超過三分之一是60歲以上的長者,政府收入隨 着勞動人口的減少而日漸萎縮,巴斯將日本的情況比喻為馬多夫(Madoff)的「龐茲投資計劃」,意思是投入工作人口比離開的多,政府財政最後將無法支 撑。《HC通訊》並引述11月28日路透報道,OECD指出,日本政府債務不斷增加,長期利率(JGB)有上升風險。意大利的長債利率上升帶來的後果將成 為日本的前車之鑑。

巴斯將美國列為歐洲和日本之後的第三張骨牌,雖然美國的債務利息支出亦已接近聯邦政府收入的10%,但美國比歐洲先走一 步,為銀行去槓桿化做過一番工夫;而相比日本,美國傳統歡迎移民,過去10年人口都有輕微增長;巴斯並希望美國政客會汲取歐洲和日本的教訓,放棄黨派之爭 及早處理債務問題。

巴斯在AmeriCatalyst的專訪最後談及投資部署,他認為歐洲和日本的債務危機將引發資金流向美國避險,因此美 元中短期可以看高一線,但股市則不宜沾手。他解釋,美股P/E的「E」並不可靠,由於聯邦政府買入企業的「有毒」資產才令股市的P/E看似很吸引。巴斯強 調,在危機四伏的環境,未來幾年保本比追求資本增值更重要,他建議吸納有增值能力的資產(productive assets),例如油田和物業。至於黃金方面,巴斯重申必須買實金,他曾經造訪COMEX(紐約商品交易所),COMEX交收部負責人告訴巴斯,期貨及 期權合約的黃金長倉總值約800億美元,但COMEX金庫只儲存27億美元的黃金準備讓客戶提取,巴斯一算之下,若有4%期貨及期權的客戶要求實金交收, 後果也不堪設想。

《HC通訊》指出,自第二次世界大戰之後,西方發達主權國從未發生過違約事件,新一代投資者可能因此存在諾貝爾經濟獎卡尼 曼教授(Daniel Kahneman)所說的「現成啟發式(availability heuristic,人們根據現成相關例子以衡量類似事件發生的可能性)心理,普遍認為西方發達國集體主權違約是不可思議,但巴斯表示,金融史上違約事件 俯拾皆是,就連德國違約也不是陌生個案。不過,即使爆發集體主權違約也不是世界末日,當然很多投資者會蒙受巨大損失,巴斯說,他的責任就是做好對沖,保護 自己和Hayman Capital客戶不會成為虧損的一分子。

Return of capital is much more important in the next few years than return on capital. ——Kyle Bass


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Monday, November 21, 2011

中國在日本身上學到什麼? 香港經濟日報網站 www.hket.com - 主頁

2011年11月21日

畢老林 投資者日記

中國在日本身上學到什麼?


11月20日,周日。美國次按爆煲貶眼四年,西方經濟在政府干預央行印鈔下苟延殘喘半死不活。在這種過得一天得一天,看不見前景出路的低迷景況下,愈來愈多經濟學家和投資者將眼下的歐美跟過去二十年的日本相提並論。

四大高手論迷失經濟

上 周初,加拿大多倫多舉行了一場精采辯論,四位重量級經濟學家/分析師,按正反兩面捉對「廝殺」,圍繞「北美面臨日式高失業低增長年代」這個大會指定議題, 針鋒相對舌劍唇槍。「參戰」四人粒粒皆星,代表「正方」(認同大會辯題)的,是2008年諾貝爾經濟學獎得主克魯明(Paul Krugman),其「戰友」為前美林策略師、目前效力Gluskin Sheff的羅森伯格(David Rosenberg);站在「反方」見招拆招的,是克林頓時代的美國財長、曾擔任奧巴馬首席經濟顧問的森瑪斯(Lawrence Summers),而與他並肩作戰的,乃著名政治風險諮詢公司歐亞集團(Eurasia Group)的總裁布萊默(Ian Bremmer)。

毫 無疑問,大會的鎂光燈集中在兩位份屬「凱恩斯派同門」的經濟學界天之驕子——克魯明、森瑪斯——身上,惟以「綠葉」身份與辯的二人,羅森伯格乃知名「淡 友」,布萊默則憑《J曲線》(The J Curve)一書揚名四海,粉絲無數。參與辯論的四人,牡丹綠葉俱大有來頭,這一「戰」引起評論界廣泛關注,自不待言。

不過,值得注意的是,大會指定辯題假定了以北美為代表的西方經濟重蹈日本「迷失年代」覆轍,意味不管認同與否,辯論的大前提是歐美經濟過去二三十年以信貸驅動的景氣一去不返,與辯雙方激烈爭論的,只是美國等發達國能否力挽狂瀾,擺脫困擾了日本二十年的「迷失魔咒」。

「那些年」對中國的啟示

周 末重溫過去一星期的網上訪問紀錄,發現北京清華大學美籍教授程致宇(Patrick Chovenec)最近接受彭博電視專訪,大力推介一本1997年出版的舊著,書名為The Ministry: How Japan's Most Powerful Institution Endangers World Markets,作者哈切(Peter Hartcher)透過分析日本財務省(當時仍稱大藏省)上世紀八十年代扮演的角色,對灰飛煙滅於二十年前的東瀛泡沫經濟,來了一次徹底的「死因調查」。

研究日本「那些年」的著作多不勝數,此書之所以與別不同,在於作者針對大藏省在日本經濟投資過熱、資產市場狂態畢露時期的政策措施,替日本泡沫年代的種切「開棺驗屍」,當中不少發現,對在許多人眼中「無所不能」的中國領導層大有參考借鑑價值。

The Ministry一書對中國具啟迪意義之處甚多,舉其大者,就有:①在泡沫成形前,日本經濟年增長率約為4%,而物價十分穩定,通脹看起來並無失控之憂。 在決策者和外國投資者眼中,日本經濟增長只有不夠快之嫌,沒有人想到泡沫在不知不覺中滋生的危險。在大藏省掉以輕心下,日本的貨幣供應和固定資產投資於 1987年後的三四年,皆以雙位數步伐擴張。

從日本二百四十五家製造業巨企的資產回報率從1981年的8.9%,降至1991年的 5.6%,可見日本企業在八十年代後期信貸寬鬆資金廉宜的環境中,資源運用和資本投放俱不着眼於為股東以至經濟創造價值。這跟內地2002年每0.17元 人民幣信貸足以創造1元人民幣的GDP,今天每1元GDP至少須投入0.3至0.4元信貸,沒有什麼分別。

銀行走後門續放貸

② 在八十年代後期資產狂潮一發不可收拾期間,大藏省眼見泡沫已成不能坐視,先後五度向銀行發出行政指令,要求削減對用於房地產投機的貸款。這項措施起初頗具 成效,東京住宅價格在1988年下跌8%,商用物業同年亦跌價4%。受「冷卻措施」影響,不少積極投入樓市炒賣的房地產商走上破產之路,情況跟今天內地發 展商因資金鏈斷裂深陷財困大同小異。

可是,與內地「冷卻樓市」措施主要針對北京、上海、深圳等大城市,炒賣之風在二三線城市有增無減一樣, 大藏省於八十年代後期發出的行政指令,對壓抑東京房地產價格雖一度奏效,惟炒風從首都迅速蔓延至日本其他地區,這從1988年大阪、神戶和京都住宅及商用 物業價格分別大漲13%和21%可見一斑。更重要的是,遭大藏省封殺的正規借貸渠道愈多,銀行通過非正式門徑向投機者提供信貸的例子亦愈多,包括利用附屬 機構、租賃公司以至規模細小的非銀行金融機構向炒家放貸,銀行非但未因政府出手而收斂對炒家的信用額度,不少更以新增貸款協助投機者向銀行償付利息。

事實證明,東京樓價在1988年只是短暫下調,銀行「走後門」向投機者提供資金,信貸泛濫繼續推動房地產上升,1990年住宅與商用物業雙雙創出前所未見的高價,直至泡沫於翌年爆破,日本經濟「迷失」至今。

與今天「無所不能」的中國政府領導層一樣,上世紀八十年代的大藏省官僚亦曾被視為「調控經濟」能手,惟上有政策下有對策,日本金融機構以種種非正規渠道繞過大藏省的行政指令,搞出一個更大的泡沫,令人想起今天內地的「影子銀行體系」。

東瀛房地產景氣最終無以為繼,大藏省反過來因擔心破產潮湧現銀行壞賬山積,要求金融機構維持信貸生命線,協助企業苟延殘喘,一拖就是二十年。

在浙江省溫州市爆發「走佬潮」後,中央對大量涉及投機活動的企業已有「放水」扶助之意,銀行因此而承受較高水平的呆壞賬亦在所不計。如果在多倫多舉行的那場辯論,題目改為「中國面對日式泡沫爆破」,四位星級論者不知又有何高見?

Friday, September 23, 2011

亞洲風暴似重演 見底絕非在今年 - 信報網站

亞洲風暴似重演 見底絕非在今年 - 信報網站

2011年9月23日

羅家聰 一名經人

亞洲風暴似重演 見底絕非在今年


正當人人都在談歐債、說OT之際,這邊廂的亞洲,已悄悄地醞釀着另一場危機。

心水清者會留意到,自8月底起,亞洲貨幣兌美元普遍大幅下挫【圖1】。是的,這拜美滙指數自當時起急速上揚所致,但是無論如何,滙價大跌對任何新興市場來講,後果皆可以很災難性,尤其這次大跌之前不少價格都曾大升,一如1998、2008年前。


亞洲央行多愛干預滙市,故滙率現價未必反映真正的升值、貶值壓力。若看遠滙,純由市場力量致使的升、貶壓力就悉數反映了。

從各亞洲貨幣兌美元的一年期遠滙自2009年3月4日聯儲局QE1美滙指數見頂(時為89.6,現約76)起的累積變幅可見,包括印尼盾、菲律賓披索及南韓圜三幣,早前實際的升值壓力比現滙所見為大【圖2】(與圖一比較即見這個結論)。八隻亞洲幣兌美元遠滙,兩年半間普遍升值兩、三成,升四至七成也有,這相當於歐羅由低位算二升上算半至兩算,升勢顯然急得不合理。

這可由這八個亞洲股市得到印證。再由2009年3月初聯儲局QE1美股見底計起,截至今年7、8月間,八地股市均累升80%至240%不等【圖3】。若對照九七亞洲金融風暴前股市自1995年11月中起急升的一段,其時累升最狂的台灣股市亦不過120%,而南韓、泰國股市更早於1994年見頂【圖4】,可見今次股市累升有過之而無不及。

樓價升埋下危機

股市如是,那樓市呢?八地當中大多沒有1997年前的樓價紀錄,就看近年,各地樓價自2002年末季見底至今普遍累升四成至一倍,印度累升三倍,僅泰國因政局動盪而例外;且升勢尤以QE後的近兩年半特急【圖5】。而這,就埋下了危機種子。

記得上次亞洲金融風暴怎形成嗎?原因很清楚的。踏入1990年代初,美國在儲貸危機仍未完全清理下挑起波斯灣戰爭,導致1990年衰退;同期西德背負了東德包袱,結果1992、93年間嚴重衰退,法國也受牽連,日本更甭說了。

此時,市場「赫然發現」亞洲(除日本)那邊風景獨好;於是,儘管1993、94年間亞洲小國也跟隨外圍調整,但1994、95年起資金便大舉湧入,炒股炒樓兼炒滙。當股樓滙等可以炒高的資產價格都炒得夠高時,大跌條件已經俱備,只欠沽空炒家。重觀上文五圖,現在其實一樣。

從來都說,在環球一體化下,週期上落不會有什麼風景那邊獨好。全球瘋狂泵水,水到就如日本海嘯,何止渠成,所有股樓滙都如汽車房屋全部一湧浮起;至於水退嘛,自然統統沖走洗得乾乾淨淨。

日本、台灣,在1980、1990年代間試過一次,大半亞洲則在1990、2000年代間再試一次。現在?整個亞洲已在2000、2010年代間試第三次。好玩嗎?好!升時當然好玩。不過玩完之後,一如「風箏」一曲:斷了線,飛得太高,跌得痛楚。別賴炒家搞亂檔,他們僅在沽壓明顯的背景下順勢而行,加多一腳而已。

資金曾大舉流入

資金流入,可從資本賬(capital account)的數字得知。任何人聲稱看到資金進出,都是吹牛;誰有本事看到所有人的戶口資金流?但資本賬就紀錄確鑿,只是後知後覺。觀圖可見,過去兩年半確有資金大舉流入【圖6】,不過這數據對未來毫無前瞻作用。君不見截至2007年底環球股市見頂之際,資金淨流入額還在居高不下?錢走如跌市,話來就來,無得看的。

要預知跌市就要用腦想,不是用眼看的。經濟年幾之前已轉差,稍經大腦都知跌市必現;要跌了才看到,就只能怪當初不肯相信大市表現終繫經濟。

利息一樣。市跌了、錢走了,利率才會抽升。過去年半,亞洲各地三個月期拆息,除印度外並無顯著異樣【圖7】。有些行走江湖多年的老行尊,也聲大大指利率難升。但事實是,通脹壓力推升長息;只要一驚,短息也會登時爆升,即整條利率曲線都升。世界就是這樣了,落雨收遮,市愈跌時息愈升。另美國狂印的銀紙在美元轉強下回流,且信貸在升(見月初「信貸好轉通脹來 樓價縱跌亦難改」一文),美國通脹只會續升,進一步帶動環球利率曲線上移,引發新一輪的資產拆倉潮,形成螺旋式的惡性循環。

緊張氣氛下利率飆升,首當其衝當然是短息。聯儲局還慌短息升壓不夠而耍什麼OT把戲,這只會催告利率曲線更趨平坦甚至逆向。而遠早於這把戲推出的兩年之前,亞洲各地十年、兩年息差已見頂回落【圖8】,意味由時起的四至六季後經濟將逆轉。觀乎2006至08年間,亞洲息差未見負數而僅是貼地(趨零),之後已見經濟大幅衰退【圖9】;今回印度、泰國、南韓、台灣、馬來西亞的息差也趨貼地,還有星州尾隨,往後局勢已不問可知。別鬧圖九還未見收縮;待按年都見縮時,已跌到不清不楚了。

近期見到有些年資尚淺的炒家寫手,純因氣氛腥風血雨或是估值便宜便呼籲撈底。那些人不知道,相反理論只會在大轉角時適用,一個熊市只適用一次。

可惜整個熊市,大部分時間(尤是後半)氣氛都血腥的,貿貿然聽這班未見過大蛇痾尿之士教路入市,輸光都未天光。過去數周,那班趕着入市的相反理論家,料已應秋風起而成大閘蟹。

購買力蠶食殆盡

至於基金經理,不論牛市熊市,天天都叫人買貨,因為你不買貨他們便失業。從管理基金的角度而言,他們斷無可能待熊市低點才將全部資金一天買光,因來不及;故其操作有必要未見底時便開始買。但身為個人管理自己有限財富,卻無必要未到底便趕買趕坐艇。一買就綁滋味難受,故傳統智慧教寧買當頭起,寧願見底後才貴買。

回顧一般熊市,通常起碼年半、兩年,即有更長(如2000至2003年)。點解呢?因經濟周期平均四年,計死數言,逆轉平均兩年;跌市見諸經濟逆轉,維時便近兩年。今回跌市始於去年11月初(宣佈QE2當日,恒指兩萬五),照數時間亦非今年見底。加上亞洲樓價大冧伊始,衰退起碼雙底,故今趟逆轉、熊市能否真的見底亦成疑問。

八千至萬一的恒指目標早成笑柄,去年指恒指若跌可見萬二、萬四恍如天方夜譚;如今驀然回首,怕且另有體會。為什麼當時會成笑柄、天方夜譚?因為世人迷信錢多,就會升市。

不過在下讀書所學的,是錢多最終將變通脹,不是升市;這毋須PhD才懂。現在錢很多了、息很低了,升市呢?去了哪?還沉醉低息錢多無跌市者,瞓醒未呢?

曾在電視節目講過多次,今次跌市會很消耗性的,猶如2000年或1976年的兩次。這三次跌有共通點,乃三次都是「餘震」──後金融海嘯、後亞洲風暴、後石油危機,跌得慢但跌得久。

不斷偷步不斷被綁,加上通脹肆虐,未來數年,購買力將被蠶食盡,游資過剩亦將不再,一如政改,一切重返基本,由哪裏開始瘋狂,就在哪裏正式收檔。

無人愛聽末日言論,在下也不例外。但只要你自己也看看數據,是客觀的數據,你也會得類似結論。見到極壞的真相,直言大家好呢,還是如那些未見過大蛇痾尿的,呼籲心口掛着勇字去當血肉長城好呢?究竟在這些日子,贏錢緊要還是輸錢緊要呢?

交通銀行(香港分行)


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Monday, September 19, 2011

China vs India Yasheng Huang: Does democracy stifle economic growth?

Yasheng Huang: Does democracy stifle economic growth?


My topic is economic growth in China and India.And the question I want to explore with you is whether or not democracy has helped or has hindered economic growth. You may say this is not fair, because I'm selecting two countries to make a case against democracy. Actually, exactly the opposite is what I'm going to do. I'm going to use these two countries to make an economic argument for democracy, rather than against democracy.

The first question there is why China has grown so much faster than India. Over the last 30 years, in terms of the GDP growth rates, China has grown at twice the rate of India. In the last five years, the two countries have begun to converge somewhat in economic growth. But over the last 30 years, China undoubtedly has done much better than India. One simple answer is China has Shanghai and India has Mumbai. Look at the skyline of Shanghai. This is the Pudong area. The picture on India is the Dharavi slum of Mumbai in India. The idea therebehind these two pictures is that the Chinese government can act above rule of law. It can planfor the long-term benefits of the country and in the process, evict millions of people -- that's just a small technical issue. Whereas in India, you cannot do that, because you have to listen to the public. You're being constrained by the public's opinion. Even Prime Minister Manmohan Singhagrees with that view. In an interview printed in the financial press of India, He said that he wants to make Mumbai another Shanghai. This is an Oxford-trained economist steeped in humanistic values, and yet he agrees with the high-pressure tactics of Shanghai.

So let me call it the Shanghai model of economic growth, that emphasizes the following features for promoting economic development: infrastructures, airports, highways, bridges, things like that. And you need a strong government to do that, because you cannot respect private property rights. You cannot be constrained by the public's opinion. You need also state ownership, especially of land assets, in order to build and roll out infrastructuresvery quickly. The implication of that model is that democracy is a hindrance for economic growth,rather than a facilitator of economic growth. Here's the key question. Just how important are infrastructures for economic growth? This is a key issue. If you believe that infrastructures are very important for economic growth, then you would argue a strong government is necessary to promote growth. If you believe that infrastructures are not as important as many people believe, then you will put less emphasis on strong government.

So to illustrate that question, let me give you two countries. And for the sake of brevity, I'll call one country Country 1 and the other country Country 2.Country 1 has a systematic advantage over Country 2 in infrastructures. Country 1 has more telephones, and Country 1 has a longer system of railways. So if I were to ask you, "Which is Chinaand which is India, and which country has grown faster?" if you believe in the infrastructure view, then you will say, "Country 1 must be China. They must have done better, in terms of economic growth. And Country 2 is possibly India."

Actually the country with more telephones is the Soviet Union, and the data referred to 1989. After the country reported very impressive statistics on telephones, the country collapsed. That's not too good. The picture there is Khrushchev. I know that in 1989 he no longer ruled the Soviet Union, but that's the best picture that I can find. (Laughter)Telephones, infrastructures do not guarantee you economic growth. Country 2, that has fewer telephones, is China. Since 1989, the country has performed at a double-digit rate every year for the last 20 years. If you know nothing about China and the Soviet Union other than the fact about their telephones, you would have made a poor prediction about their economic growth in the next two decades.

Country 1, that has a longer system of railways, is actually India. And Country 2 is China. This is a very little known fact about the two countries. Yes, today China has a huge infrastructure advantage over India. But for many years, until the late 1990s,China had an infrastructure disadvantage vis-a-vis India. In developing countries, the most common mode of transportation is the railways, and the British built a lot of railways in India. India is the smaller of the two countries, and yet it had a longer system of railways until the late 1990s. So clearly,infrastructure doesn't explain why China did better before the late 1990s, as compared with India.

In fact, if you look at the evidence worldwide, the evidence is more supportive of the view that the infrastructure are actually the result of economic growth. The economy grows, government accumulates more resources, and the government can invest in infrastructure -- rather than infrastructure being a cause for economic growth.And this is clearly the story of the Chinese economic growth. Let me look at this question more directly. Is democracy bad for economic growth? Now let's turn to two countries, Country A and Country B. Country A, in 1990, had about $300 per capita GDP as compared with Country B, which had $460 in per capita GDP. By 2008, Country A has surpassed Country B with $700 per capita GDP as compared with $650 per capita GDP. Both countries are in Asia.

If I were to ask you, "Which are the two Asian countries? And which one is a democracy?" you may argue, "Well, maybe Country A is China and Country B is India." In fact, Country A is democratic India, and Country B is Pakistan -- the country that has a long period of military rule. And it's very common that we compare India with China. That's because the two countries have about the same population size. But the more natural comparisonis actually between India and Pakistan. Those two countries are geographically similar. They have a complicated, but shared common history. By that comparison, democracy looks very, very good in terms of economic growth.

So why do economists fall in love with authoritarian governments? One reason is the East Asian Model. In East Asia, we have had successful economic growth stories such as Korea, Taiwan,Hong Kong and Singapore. Some of these economies were ruled by authoritarian governments in the 60s and 70s and 1980s. The problem with that view is like asking all the winners of lotteries, "Have you won the lottery?" And they all tell you, "Yes, we have won the lottery." And then you draw the conclusion the odds of winning the lottery are 100 percent. The reason is you never goand bother to ask the losers who also purchased lottery tickets and didn't end up winning the prize.

For each of these successful authoritarian governments in East Asia, there's a matched failure. Korea succeeded, North Korea didn't.Taiwan succeeded, China under Mao Zedong didn't. Burma didn't succeed. The Philippines didn't succeed. If you look at the statistical evidence worldwide, there's really no support for the idea that authoritarian governments hold a systematic edge over democracies in terms of economic growth. So the East Asian model has this massive selection bias, because of selecting on a dependent variable -- something we always tell our students to avoid.

So exactly why did China grow so much faster? I will take you to the Cultural Revolution, when China went mad, and compare that country's performance with India under Indira Gandhi. The question there is: Which country did better, China or India? China was during the Cultural Revolution. It turns out even during the Cultural Revolution, China out-perfomed India in terms of GDP growth by an average of about 2.2 percent every year in terms of per capita GDP. So that's when China was mad. The whole country went mad. It must mean that the countryhad something so advantageous to itself in terms of economic growth to overcome the negative effects of the Cultural Revolution. The advantage the country had was human capital -- nothing else but human capital.

This is the world development index indicator datain the early 1990s. And this is the earliest data that I can find. The adult literacy rate in China is 77 percent as compared with 48 percent in India. The contrast in literacy rates is especially sharpbetween Chinese women and Indian women. I haven't told you about the definition of literacy. In China, the definition of literacy is the ability to read and write 1,500 Chinese characters. In India, the definition of literacy, operating definition of literacy,is the ability, the grand ability, to write your own name in whatever language you happen to speak.The gap between the two countries in terms of literacy is much more substantial than the data here indicated. If you go to other sources of datasuch as Human Development Index, that data series, go back to the early 1970s, you see exactly the same contrast. China held a huge advantage in terms of human capital vis-a-vis India.

Life expectancies: as early as 1965, China had a huge advantage in life expectancy. On average, as a Chinese in 1965, you lived 10 years more than an average Indian. So if you have a choice between being a Chinese and being an Indian, you would want to become a Chinese in order to live 10 years longer. If you made that decision in 1965, the down side of that is the next year we have the Cultural Revolution. So you have to always think carefullyabout these decisions.

If you cannot chose your nationality, then you will want to become an Indian man. Because, as an Indian man, you have about two years of life expectancy advantage vis-a-vis Indian women. This is an extremely strange fact. It's very rare among countries to have this kind of pattern. It shows the systematic discrimination and biases in the Indian society against women. The good news is, by 2006, India has closed the gap between men and women in terms of life expectancy. Today, Indian women have a sizable life expectancy edge over Indian men. So India is reverting to the normal. But India still has a lot of work to do in terms of gender equality.

These are the two pictures taken of garment factories in Guandong Province and garment factories in India. In China, it's all women. 60 to 80 percent of the workforce in China is women in the coastal part of the country, whereas in India, it's all men. Financial Times printed this picture of an Indian textile factory with the title, "India Poised to Overtake China in Textile." By looking at these two pictures, I say no, it won't overtake China for a while. If you look at other East Asian countries,women there play a hugely important role in terms of economic take-off -- in terms of creating the manufacturing miracle associated with East Asia.India still has a long way to go to catch up with China.

Then the issue is, what about the Chinese political system? You talk about human capital, you talk about education and public health. What about the political system? Isn't it true that the one-party political system has facilitated economic growth in China? Actually, the answer is more nuanced and subtle than that. It depends on a distinction that you draw between statics of the political system and the dynamics of the political system. Statically, China is a one-party system, authoritarian -- there's no question about it. Dynamically, it has changed over time to become less authoritarian and more democratic. When you explain change -- for example, economic growth; economic growth is about change -- when you explain change, you use other things that have changed to explain change,rather than using the constant to explain change.Sometimes a fixed effect can explain change, but a fixed effect only explains changes in interaction with the things that change.

In terms of the political changes, they have introduced village elections. They have increased the security of proprietors. And they have increased the security with long-term land leases. There are also financial reforms in rural China. There is also a rural entrepreneurial revolution in China. To me, the pace of political changes is too slow, too gradual. And my own view is the country is going to face some substantial challenges, because they have not moved further and faster on political reforms. But nevertheless, the system has moved in a more liberal direction, moved in a more democratic direction.

You can apply exactly the same dynamic perspective in India. In fact, when India was growing at a Hindu rate of growth -- about one percent, two percent a year -- that was when India was least democratic. Indira Gandhi declared emergency rule in 1975. The Indian government owned and operated all the TV stations. A little-known fact about India in the 1990s is that the country not only has undertaken economic reforms,the country has also undertaken political reformsby introducing village self-rule, privatization of media and introducing freedom of information acts.So the dynamic perspective fits both with China and in India in terms of the direction.

Why do many people believe that India is still a growth disaster? One reason is they are always comparing India with China. But China is a superstar in terms of economic growth. If you are a NBA player and you are always being compared to Michael Jordan, you're going to look not so impressive. But that doesn't mean that you're a bad basketball player. Comparing with a superstar is the wrong benchmark. In fact, if you compare Indiawith the average developing country, even before the more recent period of acceleration of Indian growth -- now India is growing between eight and nine percent -- even before this period, India was ranked fourth in terms of economic growth among emerging economies. This is a very impressive record indeed.

Let's think about the future: the dragon vis-a-vis the elephant. Which country has the growth momentum? China, I believe, still has some of the excellent raw fundamentals -- mostly the social capital, the public health, the sense of egalitarianism that you don't find in India. But I believe that India has the momentum. It has the improving fundamentals. The government has invested in basic education, has invested in basic health. I believe the government should do more,but nevertheless, the direction it is moving in is the right direction. India has the right institutional conditions for economic growth, whereas China is still struggling with political reforms.

I believe that the political reforms are a must for China to maintain its growth. And it's very important to have political reforms, to have widely shared benefits of economic growth. I don't know whether that's going to happen or not, but I'm an optimist.Hopefully, five years from now, I'm going to report to TEDGlobal that political reforms will happen in China.

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