「避險天才」預期大衰退 Michael Burry，1971 /// Michael Lewis

2012年6月29日

信報研究部 投資分析

「避險天才」預期大衰退

對沖基金Greenlight Capital創辦人艾因霍恩（David Einhorn）2002年5月透露，分析發現投資機構Allied Capital賬目不合邏輯，Greenlight因此已拋空Allied股票，導致翌日Allied股價急挫並一度停牌，亦為艾因霍恩引致Allied 透過證交會SEC的長期找麻煩報復（詳見2010年12月21日信研「Long Short王投資回顧前瞻」）；但艾因霍恩惹來的麻煩相比另一位年輕投資才俊只算是雞毛蒜皮小事，2010年4月3日，《紐約時報》一篇質詢聯儲局眼光的 文章竟為作者引來幾個政府部門的圍攻。
加州大學洛杉磯分校（UCLA）經濟系今年6月中旬舉行的畢業禮邀請了米高．布利（Michael Burry，1971）為主要致辭嘉賓。典禮主持人介紹說，米高1993年在UCLA經濟系畢業後，到Vanderbilt University School of Medicine考取醫生資格，然後在Stanford University Hospital作為神經學（neurology）實習醫生期間離開醫學界重返經濟專業，他在2000年創立對沖基金Scion Capital時，米高醫生已是卓有名望的揀股高手。
英女皇在金融危機爆發約一年半後造訪LSE（倫敦政治經濟學院）時問道，為什麼沒有人 預測到危機的發生？主持人不無驕傲地表示，英女皇應該來UCLA訪問，因為米高憑他眼光獨到的分析，預見了美國金融和房地產市場的崩潰，以及AIG、房利 美、房貸美、Countrywide Financial、華盛頓互惠等的破產危機，名作家路易斯（Michael Lewis）的銷書The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine（2010年3月）便記述了米高的故事。
路易斯的生花妙筆可以將 不同階段零碎的真人真事（部分可能枯燥無味）貫串起來，編寫成小說般吸引人一讀即不能釋手，他較早期的作品Liar's Poker（1989）已被推許為華爾街必讀之選；在路易斯筆下：布利未到兩歲便患上一種罕見的癌症，手術雖然成功切除腫瘤，但亦令他失去了左眼，一個裝 上玻璃眼珠的小孩子少不免會成為玩伴嘲弄的對象，也可能由此養成布利慣於離群自學不擅於社交的性格（布利成年後確實被診斷有亞斯伯格症Asperger Syndrome，亞斯伯格症臨床特徵與自閉症有很多相似之處，例如社交技巧缺陷，又例如對某些事物具有超越一般人的興趣）；布利亦承認，他對於個別事物 一是全無興趣，一是如着魔般苦心鑽研，因此他才會選讀經濟以至醫學等高深複雜科目。
在Stanford醫學院實習的1990年代後期，布利 迷上了電腦，並利用電腦研究股市，目的可能為了驗證他父親的評語是否確實無誤──布利讀中學時他父親曾指着一份報章的股價表說，股市根本是一個騙局。布利 首先從殿堂級大師格拉罕（Benjamin Graham）的價值投資學習股票知識，再研究格拉罕的得意弟子、當代股壇巨星畢非德的投資心得和買賣股票法門，愈深入研究，布利發現愈不可能單靠一些投 資原則便可以複製成為另一個畢非德。
創立獨特風格
他亦豁然省悞，師承格拉罕的畢非德，也並不全盤照抄格拉罕的一套而別闢蹊徑創立自己的個人獨特風格；布利在醫院輪班工作16小時之餘抽空開blog發表股評，又公開他經過仔細分析認為值得買入的股票，並上載他的投資成績表。
布 利在網上的「無心插柳」很快便引起華爾街專業人士的注意，一位基金經理表示：「這傢伙只是一個見習醫生……他在科網股泡沫中實踐價值投資……我們都輸錢， 又流失客戶，他的成績單卻增長50%……這個神秘超人……不單止我們在看着……他的模式是見人所未見。」事實上，布利發現他的blog網訪客包括富達互惠 基金和華爾街大行摩根士丹利，他甚至懷疑有華爾街基金經理跟隨他的投資組合買賣。2000年，布利離開Stanford籌組自己的基金，當其時他全副身家 只有4萬美元，即使加上母親和三位兄弟投他信心一票的3萬美元，合起來還不夠他的教育貸款債務14.5萬美元的一半，但心懷大志的布利卻宣傳若要投資他的 基金，客戶最少需擁有1500萬美元資產──布利和他認識的所有朋友都沒有資格成為基金投資者的條件。
意想不到的是，布利在捉襟見肘的窘境 （租辦公室、購買家具等在在需財）中接到兩個電話：首先是紐約的大型投資基金Gotham Capital創辦人Joel Greenblatt，Greenblatt不少職員坦承根據布利的推薦一直賺錢，因此Greenblatt提出用1百萬美元買入布利基金的四分之一股 權；第二個電話來自保險公司White Mountain的Kip Oberting（後來Oberting創辦基金公司KVO Capital Management，金融危機後，Oberting形容布利是「避險機」a risk-avoider），Oberting一直留意布利的一舉一動，他準備從White Mountain投資的一隻基金抽調60萬美元支持布利，並承諾將加注1千萬美元；布利的Scion Capital於是順利開業。
炒作次按CDS
布利亦沒有令他的投資者失望，Scion頭三年分別取得55%、16%、50%投資回報，而同期2001至2003年標普500指數分別下跌11.8%、22.1%和28.6%；2005年中，當大圍股市指數下跌6.84%，布利的基金卻增長242%。
但 布利的最得意傑作是在2005年決定不再投資股票，轉為專注炒作次按有關例如CDS衍生工具，原因是他分析發現房貸按揭市場很多不正常現象：房價升幅大大 偏離家庭收入曲線、無入息人士也可以借錢買樓、評級機構的信貸評級標準混亂，最令人吃驚的是業主可以自訂按揭還款方式，銀行甚至接受按揭首兩年不需還本也 不需付息……等等的典型泡沫迹象，他預期房地產泡沫最遲在兩年後即2007年大部分按揭重訂條款時爆破。布利分別要求大型投行例如高盛和大摩就次按的 CDS開價，當時根本沒有人認為升勢如火如荼的房價會掉頭下跌，他成功以低得後來證明難以置信的價錢分批買入大量次按CDS。有趣的是，在房地產泡沫爆破 前，布利先後接到多間投行的電話希望「回購」早年售出的次按CDS。
美國的房地產泡沫結果已寫在牆上，但不擅於交際的布利在泡沫爆破之前曾 面對不少客戶批評他「不務正業」，由最拿手的股市轉而投入一些例如ABS、CDS、Alt-A、RMBS等等讓人聽到一頭霧水的衍生產品市場，很多客戶若 不是受基金條款所限早已撤資（布利要求投資他的基金一般在兩年內不可以退出）。而布利感到「心灰意冷」的是，房地產泡沫一如預期爆破之後，先前威脅贖回基 金現在賺大錢的客戶，沒有一個人讚他當年作出正確的決定，更不要提誠意道歉。布利於2008年結束了Scion。
布利在UCLA除了再次解 釋他預見房地產泡沫不能持續的理據，並透露他2010年4月3日在《紐約時報》以I Saw the Crisis Coming, Why Didn’t the Fed? 為題回應聯儲局前主席格林斯平發言的文章刊出後兩個星期，政府派人審核他所有6個早已停止運作的基金；然後國會金融危機調查組要求他提交全部電郵記錄，和 2003年以來曾經與他通話的所有人的名單；沒多久，聯邦調查局有人找上門來。政府花費大量人力財力只因為他問了一條有損聯儲局尊嚴的問題。
布 利表示，美國房地產泡沫及金融危機並不是「黑天鵝」而是可預測和有辦法防止的，但聯儲局故步自封，用過時的經濟理論處理現代的金融市場問題，後果不問而 知。布利提醒他的學弟學妹說，金融危機的影響尚未成為過去，而貝南奇仍固執地沿用失效的舊邏輯，加上美國債務總額超過GDP的200%的新危機種子，他忠 告UCLA應屆畢業生好好準備，在他們的年代將要面對另一次大衰退。
策劃：信報研究部
撰文：徐天任


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How the iPhone widens the US trade deficit with China

How the iPhone widens the US trade deficit with China
http://voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/6335


Yuqing Xing
10 April 2011

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What can the iPhone tell us about the trade imbalance between China and the US? This column argues that current trade statistics greatly inflate the value of China’s iPhone exports to the US, since China's value added accounts for only a very small portion of the Apple product's price. Given this, the renminbi’s appreciation would have little impact on the global demand for products assembled in China.

At the centre of global imbalances is the bilateral trade imbalance between China and the US. Most attention to date has been focused on macro factors and China’s exchange-rate regime. Little attention, however, has been paid to the structural factors of economies and global production networks that have reversed conventional trade patterns, transformed the implications of trade statistics and weakened the effectiveness of exchange rates on trade balances.

Today’s trade is not that experienced by the British economist David Ricardo two hundred years ago (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2008). It is almost impossible to define clearly where a manufactured product is made in the global market. This is why on the back of an iPhone one can read “Designed by Apple in California, Assembled in China”. In this column, I use the smartphone in your pocket to argue that current trade statistics have distorted the reality of the Sino-US trade imbalance and the appreciation of the renminbi would have little impact on the imbalance.
How iPhones are produced

The iPhone is designed and marketed by Apple. Apart from its software and product design, the production of iPhones primarily takes place outside of the US. Manufacturing iPhones involves nine companies, which are located in China, South Korea, Japan, Germany and the US (Table 1). All iPhone components produced by these companies are shipped to Foxconn, a Taiwanese company located in China, for assembly into final products and then exported to the US and the rest of the world.

By any definition, the iPhone belongs to high-tech products, where the US has an indisputable comparative advantage and China does not domestically produce any products that could compete with it. However, the iPhone trade pattern is not what is predicted by either the Ricardian comparative advantage theory or the Heckscher-Ohlin theory. The manufacturing process of the iPhone illustrates how the global production network functions, why a developing country such as China can export high-tech goods, and why the US, the country that invented the iPhone, becomes an importer.

Table 1. Apple iPhone 3G’s major components and cost drivers

Manufacturer

Component

Cost
Toshiba (Japan)

Flash Memory

$24
Display Module

$19.25
Touch Screen

$16.00
Samsung (Korea)

Application Processor

$14.46
SDRAM-Mobile DDR

$8.50
Infineon (Germany)

Baseband

$13.00
Camera Module

$9.55
RF Transceiver

$2.80
GPS Receiver

$2.25
Power IC RF Function

$1.25
Broadcom (USA)

Bluetooth/FM/WLAN

$5.95
Numonyx (USA)

Memory MCP

$3.65
Murata (Japan)

FEM

$1.35
Dialog Semiconductor (Germany)

Power IC Application Processor Function

$1.30
Cirrus Logic (USA)

Audio Codec

$1.15
Rest of Bill of Materials

$48.00
Total Bill of Materials

$172.46
Manufacturing costs

$6.50
Grand Total

$178.96

Source: Rassweiler (2009)
iPhones and the Sino-US trade imbalance

The shipment of the ready-to-use iPhones from China to the US is recorded as China’s exports to the US. Using the total manufacturing cost $178.96 as the price of the iPhone, China’s iPhone exports to the US amounted $2.0 billion in 2009. Assuming that the parts supplied by Broadcom, Numonyx and Cirrus Logic, valued at $121.5 million, were imported from the US the iPhone alone contributed $1.9 billion trade deficit to the US, about 0.8% of the US trade deficit with China (Table 2).

On the other hand, most of the export value and the deficit due to the iPhone are attributed to imported parts and components from the third countries and have nothing to do with China. Chinese workers simply put all these parts and components together and contributed only $6.50 to each iPhone, about 3.6% of the total manufacturing cost (e.g. the shipping price). The traditional way of measuring trade credits all $178.98 to China when an iPhone is shipped to the US, thus exaggerating the export volume as well as the imbalance. Decomposing the value added along the value chain of the iPhone manufacturing suggest that, of the $2.0 billion iPhone export from China, 96.4% is actually the transfer from Germany ($326 million), Japan ($670 million), Korea($259 million), the US ($108 million) and others ($ 542 million). All of these countries are involved in the iPhone production chain.

If China’s iPhone exports were calculated based on the value added, i.e., the assembling cost, the export value as well as the trade deficit in the iPhone would be much smaller, at only $73 million, just 3.6% of the $2.0 billion calculated with the prevailing method (Table 2). The sharp contrast of the two different measurements indicates that conventional trade statistics are inconsistent with trade where global production networks and production fragmentation determine cross-country flows of parts, components, and final products. The traditional method of recording trade has failed to reflect the actual value chain distribution and painted a distorted picture about the bilateral trade relations. The Sino-US bilateral trade imbalance has been greatly inflated.

Table 2. iPhone trade and the US trade deficit with China

Year

2007

2008

2009
iPhone Sales in the US* (million Units)

3.0

5.3

11.3
Shipping Price/unit**
(the US dollar)

229

174

179
China’s Export to the US in iPhone (million US dollar)

687

922.2

2,022.7
China’s Trade Surplus with the US in iPhones

N/A

N/A

1,901.2[1]
China’s iPhone exports to the US based on value added ( million US dollar)

19.5

34.35

73.45
Value added / total exports

2.8%

3.7%

3.6%
China’s trade surplus with the US in iPhones based on value added

N/A

N/A

73.45[2]

Sources: * Hughes (2010); ** Rassweiler (2009)
[1] When calculating trade deficits between PRC and the US in iPhones, we assume that all parts supplied by Broadcom and Numunyx were imported from the US.
[2] The parts provided by Broadcom and Numunyx are shipped back to the US within the ready-to-use iPhones. They are “round tripping” exports, which should not be considered as actual exports in the value-added approach.
iPhone trade and the appreciation of the renminbi

Many believe that appreciation of the renminbi would be an effective means to solve the Sino-US trade imbalance. Appreciation proponents ignore the fact that the appreciation can only affect a small portion of the cost of made/assembled-in-China products. If the renminbi appreciated against the US dollar by 20%, the iPhone's assembly cost would rise to $7.80 per unit, from $6.50, and add merely $1.30 to the total manufacturing costs. This would be equivalent to a 0.73% increase in total manufacturing costs. It is doubtful that Apple would pass this $1.30 to American consumers. Even a 50% appreciation would not bring a significant change in the total manufacturing cost, as the appreciation would only affect the assembling cost. Therefore, the expected pass-though effect of the renminbi’s appreciation on the price of the iPhone would be zero and the American consumers’ demand on the iPhone would not be affected. The appreciation of the renminbi would have little impact on the Sino-US trade imbalance.
Could the iPhone be assembled in the US?

There is no doubt that US workers and firms are capable of assembling iPhones. If all iPhones were assembled in the US, the $1.9 billion trade deficit would not exist. There are two possible reasons for Apple to use China as an exclusive assembly centre for iPhones. One is competition, the other is profit maximisation.

The gross profit margin of the iPhone was 62% when the phone was launched in 2007, then rose to 64% in 2009 due to reductions in manufacturing costs (table 3). If the market were perfectly competitive, the expected profit margin would be much lower and close to its marginal cost. The surging sales and high profit margin suggest that the intensity of competition is fairly low and Apple maintains a relative monopoly position. Therefore, it is not the competition but profit maximisation that drives the iPhone’ s assembly to China.

Table 3. Profit margin of the iPhone



2007

2008

2009
Unit Price to carriers

$600

$500

$500
Unit manufacturing costs*

$229

$174.33

$178.96
Profit margin

$371

$325.67

$321.4
Profit Margin (%)

62

65

64

Sources: iSupply, and the authors’ calculations.

An interesting hypothetical scenario is one where Apple had all iPhones assembled in the US. Assuming that the wage of American workers is ten times as high as those of their Chinese counterparts, the total assembly cost would rise to $68 and total manufacturing cost would be pushed to approximately $240. Selling iPhones assembled by American workers at $500 per unit would still leave a 50% profit margin for Apple. In this hypothetical scenario, the iPhone could contribute to US exports and reduce the US trade deficit, not only with China, but also with the rest of world. More importantly, Apple would create jobs for US low-skilled workers.

In a market economy, there is nothing wrong with a firm pursuing profit maximisation. Governments should not restrict such behaviour in any way. However, corporate social responsibility has been adopted as a part of corporate values by many multinational companies, including Apple. Employing American workers to assemble iPhones may be an effective way to practice corporate social responsibility.
Concluding remarks

Due to the limitations of the data, it is not possible to outline a more detailed distribution of the iPhone’s manufacturing value chain across all countries involved. However, adding additional countries and parts into the analysis would not change the bottom line – the value added created by Chinese workers accounts for only a small portion of a ready-to-use iPhone, so current trade statistics greatly inflate the value of China’s iPhone export to the US as well as the corresponding trade imbalance. Given this, the renminbi’s appreciation would have little impact on the global demand of the products simply assembled in China.
References

Grossman, Gene M and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg (2008), “Trading Tasks: A Simple Theory of Offshoring”, American Economic Review, 98(5):1978-1997.
Hughes, N (2010), “Piper: 15.8M US iPhone sales in 2010, even without Verizon”, Apple Insider, 6 January.
Rassweiler, A (2009), “iPhone 3G S Carries $178.96 BOM and Manufacturing Cost, iSuppli Teardown Reveals”. iSuppli, 24 June.

This article may be reproduced with appropriate attribution. See Copyright (below).

Topics: Exchange rates, International trade
Tags:

China
exchange-rate policy
global imbalances
iPhone
US




Yuqing Xing
Professor of economics and the Director of Asian Economic Program at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Tokyo
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「硬違約」浪潮將至 - 信報網站 Kyle Bass AmeriCatalyst 2011

「硬違約」浪潮將至 - 信報網站

2011年12月13日

信報研究部 投資遠見

「硬違約」浪潮將至

歐債危機已幾可肯定必將名列2011年十大經濟新聞榜首。經合組織（OECD）預期，今年環球工 業國借貸總額增至10.4萬億美元，2012年繼續上升，OECD因此警告，明年可能爆發借貸危危機。Business Insider稱為「對沖基金超級巨星」（Hedge Fund Superstar）的巴斯（Kyle Bass）11月上旬接受AmeriCatalyst訪問亦暢論當前歐、美、日的債務困局和投資部署。

時機（timing）在於投資來可算 是成敗最重要的因素，身經百戰如索羅斯，在2000年前後的科網股熱潮，也因為太早押注科網股泡沫爆破而被迫割掉虧損；對沖基金Hayman Capital創辦人巴斯（Kyle Bass）令人佩服的是他在美國房市泡沫及希臘主權債務兩場金融危機，都能夠準確拿揑時機作出投資決定，尤其是希債危機一役，巴斯在專業投資銀行也未曾注 意到希臘隱藏債務危機的情況下，幾乎是以最低價買希臘CDS（詳見2011年10月25日信研「由次按贏到希債再…… 」）。

巴 斯去年9月在AmeriCatalyst專訪解釋美國房市泡沫的理據，今年11月9日，他再接受AmeriCatalyst訪問則大談環球主權債務問題。 巴斯在11月的Hayman Capital投資通訊（《HC通訊》）警告，環球債務已達飽和水平；他在AmeriCatalyst的訪問節目指出，由2002至2011年，環球債務 以平均每年12％的速度上升，債務總額由80萬億美元增至210萬億，GDP每年平均增幅則只有4%，而政客都在盡量拖延時間（kicking the can down the road）迴避債務問題，不過，歐洲、日本、美國等全球三大發達經濟體系的債務賬單接踵到期，今天是歐洲，明天是日本，然後輪到美國，目前（美國）政客估 計還有10年時間等待經濟復蘇，政府稅收增加便會逐步解決財政收支失衡問題，但他認為，歐洲及日本危機相繼爆發的骨牌效應，大約3至5年便蔓延到美國。歷 史每次出現信貸市場債務超越GDP的200%，都是由於國家為準備戰爭而大舉借貸，在環球沒有爆發戰爭危機的今天，全球信貸市場債務超過GDP的300% 可說前所未見。

主權債務延續性公式

他表示，量度主權債務的延續性（sustainability）或是否資不 抵債（solvency）有一條簡單的公式，即債務利息支出不可以超過政府收入10%，希臘政府就因為每年債務利息支出佔政府收入達16%而導致主權違約 危機，巴斯強調不要以為希債「削髮」50%便可以解決問題，希臘政府的資產負債表只能承擔每年4.4%的利率，但希臘兩年期債券孳息已升至100%，10 年長債孳息亦高達27%（希債孳在巴斯的訪問之後持續上升，最近希臘2年和10年債息一度升至逾150%和35%），希臘實際已經完全破產。又例如另一歐 豬大國意大利，6個月前的意大利仍是歐盟中的主要樑柱，但當10年期債券孳息由5%升到6%，多年累積下來的債務因為這僅僅1%的利息成本增加，意大利頓 時陷入財政收支失控危機；而深受債務問題困擾除了歐豬五國之外還有比利時和歐羅區第二大經濟體法國。

《HC通訊》並揭穿較早前傳媒報道 IMF準備提供6000億歐羅（7940億美元）緊急貸款，讓意大利有12至18個月緩衝期去解決債務問題只是安定人心的謠言。他表示，IMF貸款的原意 是幫助國際收支平衡（balance of payments）有問題的第三世界國家以及各成員國穩定經濟，雖然IMF貸款的核心理念是為成員解決經濟危機，但並非要為揮霍無度以致債台高築的歐洲發 達國家或日本擔當最終貸款人的角色，而根據IMF網頁資料，目前IMF可用結餘只得3850億美元，遠未足以應付謠傳的7940億美元貸款額。IMF較早 前承諾為希臘提供相等於雅典政府3,200%的SDR（特別提款權）配額，已經是開IMF自己角色的玩笑。另外，歐洲金融穩定設施（EFSF）或將來其他 類似名目的機制（歐盟就歐債問題舉行多次峰會，先是成立永久性基金ESM，12月9日結束的會議通過設立財政聯盟；巴斯有預知之能？）也無法解決歐債危 機，投資者（主要是對沖基金）對EFSF擔保的歐債風險仍有很大戒心，最近EFSF發行30億歐羅債券，由於認購不足而自己購回發行額的20%；《HC通 訊》認為EFSF只是由多個囊空如洗的國家組成的機制。

勿期望IMF做救世者

巴斯又提醒投資者莫寄望IMF或 歐洲央行會成為債務危機的救世者，也不要相信政府輕言會解決難題的說話，即使危機已迫在眉睫，政客也會告訴你一切如常，例如2008年雷曼兄弟破產前一個 星期，雷曼高級債券孳息比國庫債券超出400基點，當時的財長保爾森仍堅稱銀行體系沒有問題。《HC通訊》指出，歐洲政客們也心知傾歐盟全力也走不出債務 困境，除非容許歐洲央行開動印鈔機，為歐羅區成員印製等於18萬億美元的鈔票，但大印鈔票的後果是將歐洲推回von Havenstein時期的局面（Rudolf von Havenstein是1914至1918年世界第一次大戰期間的德國中央銀行Reichsbank行長，當時他為籌募戰爭經費而大印馬克，最後導致惡性 通脹。Rudolf von Havenstein事迹請參閱2010年3月11日信研「炮製惡性通脹的翩翩公子」）。巴斯表示從未見過「有秩序違約」（orderly default）；《HC通訊》預期一幕「硬違約」（hard defaults）浪潮快將出現。

歐債危機成為今年第四季以來最熱門的財經 新聞，《HC通訊》估計日本不久將取代歐洲佔據報紙頭版，原因有二：日本是全球債務問題最嚴重的國家，公債等於政府收入的20倍，意大利、希臘都瞠乎其 後。而債務無法解開的死結是日本的人口結構，過去3年，日本的人口減少了3百萬至現在約1.28億人，由於日本是全球恐外性（xenophobic）最強 烈的發達國家，外國人要成為日本公民困難重重，全國1.28億人口之中只有1百萬並非原籍日本人。再加上全國超過三分之一是60歲以上的長者，政府收入隨 着勞動人口的減少而日漸萎縮，巴斯將日本的情況比喻為馬多夫（Madoff）的「龐茲投資計劃」，意思是投入工作人口比離開的多，政府財政最後將無法支 撑。《HC通訊》並引述11月28日路透報道，OECD指出，日本政府債務不斷增加，長期利率（JGB）有上升風險。意大利的長債利率上升帶來的後果將成 為日本的前車之鑑。

巴斯將美國列為歐洲和日本之後的第三張骨牌，雖然美國的債務利息支出亦已接近聯邦政府收入的10%，但美國比歐洲先走一 步，為銀行去槓桿化做過一番工夫；而相比日本，美國傳統歡迎移民，過去10年人口都有輕微增長；巴斯並希望美國政客會汲取歐洲和日本的教訓，放棄黨派之爭 及早處理債務問題。

巴斯在AmeriCatalyst的專訪最後談及投資部署，他認為歐洲和日本的債務危機將引發資金流向美國避險，因此美 元中短期可以看高一線，但股市則不宜沾手。他解釋，美股P／E的「E」並不可靠，由於聯邦政府買入企業的「有毒」資產才令股市的P／E看似很吸引。巴斯強 調，在危機四伏的環境，未來幾年保本比追求資本增值更重要，他建議吸納有增值能力的資產（productive assets），例如油田和物業。至於黃金方面，巴斯重申必須買實金，他曾經造訪COMEX（紐約商品交易所），COMEX交收部負責人告訴巴斯，期貨及 期權合約的黃金長倉總值約800億美元，但COMEX金庫只儲存27億美元的黃金準備讓客戶提取，巴斯一算之下，若有4%期貨及期權的客戶要求實金交收， 後果也不堪設想。

《HC通訊》指出，自第二次世界大戰之後，西方發達主權國從未發生過違約事件，新一代投資者可能因此存在諾貝爾經濟獎卡尼 曼教授（Daniel Kahneman）所說的「現成啟發式（availability heuristic，人們根據現成相關例子以衡量類似事件發生的可能性）心理，普遍認為西方發達國集體主權違約是不可思議，但巴斯表示，金融史上違約事件 俯拾皆是，就連德國違約也不是陌生個案。不過，即使爆發集體主權違約也不是世界末日，當然很多投資者會蒙受巨大損失，巴斯說，他的責任就是做好對沖，保護 自己和Hayman Capital客戶不會成為虧損的一分子。

Return of capital is much more important in the next few years than return on capital. ——Kyle Bass

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中國在日本身上學到什麼？ 香港經濟日報網站 www.hket.com - 主頁

2011年11月21日

畢老林 投資者日記

中國在日本身上學到什麼？


11月20日，周日。美國次按爆煲貶眼四年，西方經濟在政府干預央行印鈔下苟延殘喘半死不活。在這種過得一天得一天，看不見前景出路的低迷景況下，愈來愈多經濟學家和投資者將眼下的歐美跟過去二十年的日本相提並論。

四大高手論迷失經濟

上 周初，加拿大多倫多舉行了一場精采辯論，四位重量級經濟學家／分析師，按正反兩面捉對「廝殺」，圍繞「北美面臨日式高失業低增長年代」這個大會指定議題， 針鋒相對舌劍唇槍。「參戰」四人粒粒皆星，代表「正方」（認同大會辯題）的，是2008年諾貝爾經濟學獎得主克魯明（Paul Krugman），其「戰友」為前美林策略師、目前效力Gluskin Sheff的羅森伯格（David Rosenberg）；站在「反方」見招拆招的，是克林頓時代的美國財長、曾擔任奧巴馬首席經濟顧問的森瑪斯（Lawrence Summers），而與他並肩作戰的，乃著名政治風險諮詢公司歐亞集團（Eurasia Group）的總裁布萊默（Ian Bremmer）。

毫 無疑問，大會的鎂光燈集中在兩位份屬「凱恩斯派同門」的經濟學界天之驕子——克魯明、森瑪斯——身上，惟以「綠葉」身份與辯的二人，羅森伯格乃知名「淡 友」，布萊默則憑《J曲線》（The J Curve）一書揚名四海，粉絲無數。參與辯論的四人，牡丹綠葉俱大有來頭，這一「戰」引起評論界廣泛關注，自不待言。

不過，值得注意的是，大會指定辯題假定了以北美為代表的西方經濟重蹈日本「迷失年代」覆轍，意味不管認同與否，辯論的大前提是歐美經濟過去二三十年以信貸驅動的景氣一去不返，與辯雙方激烈爭論的，只是美國等發達國能否力挽狂瀾，擺脫困擾了日本二十年的「迷失魔咒」。

「那些年」對中國的啟示

周 末重溫過去一星期的網上訪問紀錄，發現北京清華大學美籍教授程致宇（Patrick Chovenec）最近接受彭博電視專訪，大力推介一本1997年出版的舊著，書名為The Ministry: How Japan's Most Powerful Institution Endangers World Markets，作者哈切（Peter Hartcher）透過分析日本財務省（當時仍稱大藏省）上世紀八十年代扮演的角色，對灰飛煙滅於二十年前的東瀛泡沫經濟，來了一次徹底的「死因調查」。

研究日本「那些年」的著作多不勝數，此書之所以與別不同，在於作者針對大藏省在日本經濟投資過熱、資產市場狂態畢露時期的政策措施，替日本泡沫年代的種切「開棺驗屍」，當中不少發現，對在許多人眼中「無所不能」的中國領導層大有參考借鑑價值。

The Ministry一書對中國具啟迪意義之處甚多，舉其大者，就有：①在泡沫成形前，日本經濟年增長率約為4％，而物價十分穩定，通脹看起來並無失控之憂。 在決策者和外國投資者眼中，日本經濟增長只有不夠快之嫌，沒有人想到泡沫在不知不覺中滋生的危險。在大藏省掉以輕心下，日本的貨幣供應和固定資產投資於 1987年後的三四年，皆以雙位數步伐擴張。

從日本二百四十五家製造業巨企的資產回報率從1981年的8.9％，降至1991年的 5.6％，可見日本企業在八十年代後期信貸寬鬆資金廉宜的環境中，資源運用和資本投放俱不着眼於為股東以至經濟創造價值。這跟內地2002年每0.17元 人民幣信貸足以創造1元人民幣的GDP，今天每1元GDP至少須投入0.3至0.4元信貸，沒有什麼分別。

銀行走後門續放貸

② 在八十年代後期資產狂潮一發不可收拾期間，大藏省眼見泡沫已成不能坐視，先後五度向銀行發出行政指令，要求削減對用於房地產投機的貸款。這項措施起初頗具 成效，東京住宅價格在1988年下跌8％，商用物業同年亦跌價4％。受「冷卻措施」影響，不少積極投入樓市炒賣的房地產商走上破產之路，情況跟今天內地發 展商因資金鏈斷裂深陷財困大同小異。

可是，與內地「冷卻樓市」措施主要針對北京、上海、深圳等大城市，炒賣之風在二三線城市有增無減一樣， 大藏省於八十年代後期發出的行政指令，對壓抑東京房地產價格雖一度奏效，惟炒風從首都迅速蔓延至日本其他地區，這從1988年大阪、神戶和京都住宅及商用 物業價格分別大漲13％和21％可見一斑。更重要的是，遭大藏省封殺的正規借貸渠道愈多，銀行通過非正式門徑向投機者提供信貸的例子亦愈多，包括利用附屬 機構、租賃公司以至規模細小的非銀行金融機構向炒家放貸，銀行非但未因政府出手而收斂對炒家的信用額度，不少更以新增貸款協助投機者向銀行償付利息。

事實證明，東京樓價在1988年只是短暫下調，銀行「走後門」向投機者提供資金，信貸泛濫繼續推動房地產上升，1990年住宅與商用物業雙雙創出前所未見的高價，直至泡沫於翌年爆破，日本經濟「迷失」至今。

與今天「無所不能」的中國政府領導層一樣，上世紀八十年代的大藏省官僚亦曾被視為「調控經濟」能手，惟上有政策下有對策，日本金融機構以種種非正規渠道繞過大藏省的行政指令，搞出一個更大的泡沫，令人想起今天內地的「影子銀行體系」。

東瀛房地產景氣最終無以為繼，大藏省反過來因擔心破產潮湧現銀行壞賬山積，要求金融機構維持信貸生命線，協助企業苟延殘喘，一拖就是二十年。

在浙江省溫州市爆發「走佬潮」後，中央對大量涉及投機活動的企業已有「放水」扶助之意，銀行因此而承受較高水平的呆壞賬亦在所不計。如果在多倫多舉行的那場辯論，題目改為「中國面對日式泡沫爆破」，四位星級論者不知又有何高見？

亞洲風暴似重演 見底絕非在今年 - 信報網站

亞洲風暴似重演 見底絕非在今年 - 信報網站

2011年9月23日

羅家聰 一名經人

亞洲風暴似重演 見底絕非在今年

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正當人人都在談歐債、說OT之際，這邊廂的亞洲，已悄悄地醞釀着另一場危機。

心水清者會留意到，自8月底起，亞洲貨幣兌美元普遍大幅下挫【圖1】。是的，這拜美滙指數自當時起急速上揚所致，但是無論如何，滙價大跌對任何新興市場來講，後果皆可以很災難性，尤其這次大跌之前不少價格都曾大升，一如1998、2008年前。

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亞洲央行多愛干預滙市，故滙率現價未必反映真正的升值、貶值壓力。若看遠滙，純由市場力量致使的升、貶壓力就悉數反映了。

從各亞洲貨幣兌美元的一年期遠滙自2009年3月4日聯儲局QE1美滙指數見頂（時為89.6，現約76）起的累積變幅可見，包括印尼盾、菲律賓披索及南韓圜三幣，早前實際的升值壓力比現滙所見為大【圖2】（與圖一比較即見這個結論）。八隻亞洲幣兌美元遠滙，兩年半間普遍升值兩、三成，升四至七成也有，這相當於歐羅由低位算二升上算半至兩算，升勢顯然急得不合理。

這可由這八個亞洲股市得到印證。再由2009年3月初聯儲局QE1美股見底計起，截至今年7、8月間，八地股市均累升80%至240%不等【圖3】。若對照九七亞洲金融風暴前股市自1995年11月中起急升的一段，其時累升最狂的台灣股市亦不過120%，而南韓、泰國股市更早於1994年見頂【圖4】，可見今次股市累升有過之而無不及。

樓價升埋下危機

股市如是，那樓市呢？八地當中大多沒有1997年前的樓價紀錄，就看近年，各地樓價自2002年末季見底至今普遍累升四成至一倍，印度累升三倍，僅泰國因政局動盪而例外；且升勢尤以QE後的近兩年半特急【圖5】。而這，就埋下了危機種子。

記得上次亞洲金融風暴怎形成嗎？原因很清楚的。踏入1990年代初，美國在儲貸危機仍未完全清理下挑起波斯灣戰爭，導致1990年衰退；同期西德背負了東德包袱，結果1992、93年間嚴重衰退，法國也受牽連，日本更甭說了。

此時，市場「赫然發現」亞洲（除日本）那邊風景獨好；於是，儘管1993、94年間亞洲小國也跟隨外圍調整，但1994、95年起資金便大舉湧入，炒股炒樓兼炒滙。當股樓滙等可以炒高的資產價格都炒得夠高時，大跌條件已經俱備，只欠沽空炒家。重觀上文五圖，現在其實一樣。

從來都說，在環球一體化下，週期上落不會有什麼風景那邊獨好。全球瘋狂泵水，水到就如日本海嘯，何止渠成，所有股樓滙都如汽車房屋全部一湧浮起；至於水退嘛，自然統統沖走洗得乾乾淨淨。

日本、台灣，在1980、1990年代間試過一次，大半亞洲則在1990、2000年代間再試一次。現在？整個亞洲已在2000、2010年代間試第三次。好玩嗎？好！升時當然好玩。不過玩完之後，一如「風箏」一曲：斷了線，飛得太高，跌得痛楚。別賴炒家搞亂檔，他們僅在沽壓明顯的背景下順勢而行，加多一腳而已。

資金曾大舉流入

資金流入，可從資本賬（capital account）的數字得知。任何人聲稱看到資金進出，都是吹牛；誰有本事看到所有人的戶口資金流？但資本賬就紀錄確鑿，只是後知後覺。觀圖可見，過去兩年半確有資金大舉流入【圖6】，不過這數據對未來毫無前瞻作用。君不見截至2007年底環球股市見頂之際，資金淨流入額還在居高不下？錢走如跌市，話來就來，無得看的。

要預知跌市就要用腦想，不是用眼看的。經濟年幾之前已轉差，稍經大腦都知跌市必現；要跌了才看到，就只能怪當初不肯相信大市表現終繫經濟。

利息一樣。市跌了、錢走了，利率才會抽升。過去年半，亞洲各地三個月期拆息，除印度外並無顯著異樣【圖7】。有些行走江湖多年的老行尊，也聲大大指利率難升。但事實是，通脹壓力推升長息；只要一驚，短息也會登時爆升，即整條利率曲線都升。世界就是這樣了，落雨收遮，市愈跌時息愈升。另美國狂印的銀紙在美元轉強下回流，且信貸在升（見月初「信貸好轉通脹來　樓價縱跌亦難改」一文），美國通脹只會續升，進一步帶動環球利率曲線上移，引發新一輪的資產拆倉潮，形成螺旋式的惡性循環。

緊張氣氛下利率飆升，首當其衝當然是短息。聯儲局還慌短息升壓不夠而耍什麼OT把戲，這只會催告利率曲線更趨平坦甚至逆向。而遠早於這把戲推出的兩年之前，亞洲各地十年、兩年息差已見頂回落【圖8】，意味由時起的四至六季後經濟將逆轉。觀乎2006至08年間，亞洲息差未見負數而僅是貼地（趨零），之後已見經濟大幅衰退【圖9】；今回印度、泰國、南韓、台灣、馬來西亞的息差也趨貼地，還有星州尾隨，往後局勢已不問可知。別鬧圖九還未見收縮；待按年都見縮時，已跌到不清不楚了。

近期見到有些年資尚淺的炒家寫手，純因氣氛腥風血雨或是估值便宜便呼籲撈底。那些人不知道，相反理論只會在大轉角時適用，一個熊市只適用一次。

可惜整個熊市，大部分時間（尤是後半）氣氛都血腥的，貿貿然聽這班未見過大蛇痾尿之士教路入市，輸光都未天光。過去數周，那班趕着入市的相反理論家，料已應秋風起而成大閘蟹。

購買力蠶食殆盡

至於基金經理，不論牛市熊市，天天都叫人買貨，因為你不買貨他們便失業。從管理基金的角度而言，他們斷無可能待熊市低點才將全部資金一天買光，因來不及；故其操作有必要未見底時便開始買。但身為個人管理自己有限財富，卻無必要未到底便趕買趕坐艇。一買就綁滋味難受，故傳統智慧教寧買當頭起，寧願見底後才貴買。

回顧一般熊市，通常起碼年半、兩年，即有更長（如2000至2003年）。點解呢？因經濟周期平均四年，計死數言，逆轉平均兩年；跌市見諸經濟逆轉，維時便近兩年。今回跌市始於去年11月初（宣佈QE2當日，恒指兩萬五），照數時間亦非今年見底。加上亞洲樓價大冧伊始，衰退起碼雙底，故今趟逆轉、熊市能否真的見底亦成疑問。

八千至萬一的恒指目標早成笑柄，去年指恒指若跌可見萬二、萬四恍如天方夜譚；如今驀然回首，怕且另有體會。為什麼當時會成笑柄、天方夜譚？因為世人迷信錢多，就會升市。

不過在下讀書所學的，是錢多最終將變通脹，不是升市；這毋須PhD才懂。現在錢很多了、息很低了，升市呢？去了哪？還沉醉低息錢多無跌市者，瞓醒未呢？

曾在電視節目講過多次，今次跌市會很消耗性的，猶如2000年或1976年的兩次。這三次跌有共通點，乃三次都是「餘震」──後金融海嘯、後亞洲風暴、後石油危機，跌得慢但跌得久。

不斷偷步不斷被綁，加上通脹肆虐，未來數年，購買力將被蠶食盡，游資過剩亦將不再，一如政改，一切重返基本，由哪裏開始瘋狂，就在哪裏正式收檔。

無人愛聽末日言論，在下也不例外。但只要你自己也看看數據，是客觀的數據，你也會得類似結論。見到極壞的真相，直言大家好呢，還是如那些未見過大蛇痾尿的，呼籲心口掛着勇字去當血肉長城好呢？究竟在這些日子，贏錢緊要還是輸錢緊要呢？

交通銀行（香港分行）

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China vs India Yasheng Huang: Does democracy stifle economic growth?

Yasheng Huang: Does democracy stifle economic growth?

http://www.ted.com/talks/yasheng_huang.html

My topic is economic growth in China and India.And the question I want to explore with you is whether or not democracy has helped or has hindered economic growth. You may say this is not fair, because I'm selecting two countries to make a case against democracy. Actually, exactly the opposite is what I'm going to do. I'm going to use these two countries to make an economic argument for democracy, rather than against democracy.

The first question there is why China has grown so much faster than India. Over the last 30 years, in terms of the GDP growth rates, China has grown at twice the rate of India. In the last five years, the two countries have begun to converge somewhat in economic growth. But over the last 30 years, China undoubtedly has done much better than India. One simple answer is China has Shanghai and India has Mumbai. Look at the skyline of Shanghai. This is the Pudong area. The picture on India is the Dharavi slum of Mumbai in India. The idea therebehind these two pictures is that the Chinese government can act above rule of law. It can planfor the long-term benefits of the country and in the process, evict millions of people -- that's just a small technical issue. Whereas in India, you cannot do that, because you have to listen to the public. You're being constrained by the public's opinion. Even Prime Minister Manmohan Singhagrees with that view. In an interview printed in the financial press of India, He said that he wants to make Mumbai another Shanghai. This is an Oxford-trained economist steeped in humanistic values, and yet he agrees with the high-pressure tactics of Shanghai.

So let me call it the Shanghai model of economic growth, that emphasizes the following features for promoting economic development: infrastructures, airports, highways, bridges, things like that. And you need a strong government to do that, because you cannot respect private property rights. You cannot be constrained by the public's opinion. You need also state ownership, especially of land assets, in order to build and roll out infrastructuresvery quickly. The implication of that model is that democracy is a hindrance for economic growth,rather than a facilitator of economic growth. Here's the key question. Just how important are infrastructures for economic growth? This is a key issue. If you believe that infrastructures are very important for economic growth, then you would argue a strong government is necessary to promote growth. If you believe that infrastructures are not as important as many people believe, then you will put less emphasis on strong government.

So to illustrate that question, let me give you two countries. And for the sake of brevity, I'll call one country Country 1 and the other country Country 2.Country 1 has a systematic advantage over Country 2 in infrastructures. Country 1 has more telephones, and Country 1 has a longer system of railways. So if I were to ask you, "Which is Chinaand which is India, and which country has grown faster?" if you believe in the infrastructure view, then you will say, "Country 1 must be China. They must have done better, in terms of economic growth. And Country 2 is possibly India."

Actually the country with more telephones is the Soviet Union, and the data referred to 1989. After the country reported very impressive statistics on telephones, the country collapsed. That's not too good. The picture there is Khrushchev. I know that in 1989 he no longer ruled the Soviet Union, but that's the best picture that I can find. (Laughter)Telephones, infrastructures do not guarantee you economic growth. Country 2, that has fewer telephones, is China. Since 1989, the country has performed at a double-digit rate every year for the last 20 years. If you know nothing about China and the Soviet Union other than the fact about their telephones, you would have made a poor prediction about their economic growth in the next two decades.

Country 1, that has a longer system of railways, is actually India. And Country 2 is China. This is a very little known fact about the two countries. Yes, today China has a huge infrastructure advantage over India. But for many years, until the late 1990s,China had an infrastructure disadvantage vis-a-vis India. In developing countries, the most common mode of transportation is the railways, and the British built a lot of railways in India. India is the smaller of the two countries, and yet it had a longer system of railways until the late 1990s. So clearly,infrastructure doesn't explain why China did better before the late 1990s, as compared with India.

In fact, if you look at the evidence worldwide, the evidence is more supportive of the view that the infrastructure are actually the result of economic growth. The economy grows, government accumulates more resources, and the government can invest in infrastructure -- rather than infrastructure being a cause for economic growth.And this is clearly the story of the Chinese economic growth. Let me look at this question more directly. Is democracy bad for economic growth? Now let's turn to two countries, Country A and Country B. Country A, in 1990, had about $300 per capita GDP as compared with Country B, which had $460 in per capita GDP. By 2008, Country A has surpassed Country B with $700 per capita GDP as compared with $650 per capita GDP. Both countries are in Asia.

If I were to ask you, "Which are the two Asian countries? And which one is a democracy?" you may argue, "Well, maybe Country A is China and Country B is India." In fact, Country A is democratic India, and Country B is Pakistan -- the country that has a long period of military rule. And it's very common that we compare India with China. That's because the two countries have about the same population size. But the more natural comparisonis actually between India and Pakistan. Those two countries are geographically similar. They have a complicated, but shared common history. By that comparison, democracy looks very, very good in terms of economic growth.

So why do economists fall in love with authoritarian governments? One reason is the East Asian Model. In East Asia, we have had successful economic growth stories such as Korea, Taiwan,Hong Kong and Singapore. Some of these economies were ruled by authoritarian governments in the 60s and 70s and 1980s. The problem with that view is like asking all the winners of lotteries, "Have you won the lottery?" And they all tell you, "Yes, we have won the lottery." And then you draw the conclusion the odds of winning the lottery are 100 percent. The reason is you never goand bother to ask the losers who also purchased lottery tickets and didn't end up winning the prize.

For each of these successful authoritarian governments in East Asia, there's a matched failure. Korea succeeded, North Korea didn't.Taiwan succeeded, China under Mao Zedong didn't. Burma didn't succeed. The Philippines didn't succeed. If you look at the statistical evidence worldwide, there's really no support for the idea that authoritarian governments hold a systematic edge over democracies in terms of economic growth. So the East Asian model has this massive selection bias, because of selecting on a dependent variable -- something we always tell our students to avoid.

So exactly why did China grow so much faster? I will take you to the Cultural Revolution, when China went mad, and compare that country's performance with India under Indira Gandhi. The question there is: Which country did better, China or India? China was during the Cultural Revolution. It turns out even during the Cultural Revolution, China out-perfomed India in terms of GDP growth by an average of about 2.2 percent every year in terms of per capita GDP. So that's when China was mad. The whole country went mad. It must mean that the countryhad something so advantageous to itself in terms of economic growth to overcome the negative effects of the Cultural Revolution. The advantage the country had was human capital -- nothing else but human capital.

This is the world development index indicator datain the early 1990s. And this is the earliest data that I can find. The adult literacy rate in China is 77 percent as compared with 48 percent in India. The contrast in literacy rates is especially sharpbetween Chinese women and Indian women. I haven't told you about the definition of literacy. In China, the definition of literacy is the ability to read and write 1,500 Chinese characters. In India, the definition of literacy, operating definition of literacy,is the ability, the grand ability, to write your own name in whatever language you happen to speak.The gap between the two countries in terms of literacy is much more substantial than the data here indicated. If you go to other sources of datasuch as Human Development Index, that data series, go back to the early 1970s, you see exactly the same contrast. China held a huge advantage in terms of human capital vis-a-vis India.

Life expectancies: as early as 1965, China had a huge advantage in life expectancy. On average, as a Chinese in 1965, you lived 10 years more than an average Indian. So if you have a choice between being a Chinese and being an Indian, you would want to become a Chinese in order to live 10 years longer. If you made that decision in 1965, the down side of that is the next year we have the Cultural Revolution. So you have to always think carefullyabout these decisions.

If you cannot chose your nationality, then you will want to become an Indian man. Because, as an Indian man, you have about two years of life expectancy advantage vis-a-vis Indian women. This is an extremely strange fact. It's very rare among countries to have this kind of pattern. It shows the systematic discrimination and biases in the Indian society against women. The good news is, by 2006, India has closed the gap between men and women in terms of life expectancy. Today, Indian women have a sizable life expectancy edge over Indian men. So India is reverting to the normal. But India still has a lot of work to do in terms of gender equality.

These are the two pictures taken of garment factories in Guandong Province and garment factories in India. In China, it's all women. 60 to 80 percent of the workforce in China is women in the coastal part of the country, whereas in India, it's all men. Financial Times printed this picture of an Indian textile factory with the title, "India Poised to Overtake China in Textile." By looking at these two pictures, I say no, it won't overtake China for a while. If you look at other East Asian countries,women there play a hugely important role in terms of economic take-off -- in terms of creating the manufacturing miracle associated with East Asia.India still has a long way to go to catch up with China.

Then the issue is, what about the Chinese political system? You talk about human capital, you talk about education and public health. What about the political system? Isn't it true that the one-party political system has facilitated economic growth in China? Actually, the answer is more nuanced and subtle than that. It depends on a distinction that you draw between statics of the political system and the dynamics of the political system. Statically, China is a one-party system, authoritarian -- there's no question about it. Dynamically, it has changed over time to become less authoritarian and more democratic. When you explain change -- for example, economic growth; economic growth is about change -- when you explain change, you use other things that have changed to explain change,rather than using the constant to explain change.Sometimes a fixed effect can explain change, but a fixed effect only explains changes in interaction with the things that change.

In terms of the political changes, they have introduced village elections. They have increased the security of proprietors. And they have increased the security with long-term land leases. There are also financial reforms in rural China. There is also a rural entrepreneurial revolution in China. To me, the pace of political changes is too slow, too gradual. And my own view is the country is going to face some substantial challenges, because they have not moved further and faster on political reforms. But nevertheless, the system has moved in a more liberal direction, moved in a more democratic direction.

You can apply exactly the same dynamic perspective in India. In fact, when India was growing at a Hindu rate of growth -- about one percent, two percent a year -- that was when India was least democratic. Indira Gandhi declared emergency rule in 1975. The Indian government owned and operated all the TV stations. A little-known fact about India in the 1990s is that the country not only has undertaken economic reforms,the country has also undertaken political reformsby introducing village self-rule, privatization of media and introducing freedom of information acts.So the dynamic perspective fits both with China and in India in terms of the direction.

Why do many people believe that India is still a growth disaster? One reason is they are always comparing India with China. But China is a superstar in terms of economic growth. If you are a NBA player and you are always being compared to Michael Jordan, you're going to look not so impressive. But that doesn't mean that you're a bad basketball player. Comparing with a superstar is the wrong benchmark. In fact, if you compare Indiawith the average developing country, even before the more recent period of acceleration of Indian growth -- now India is growing between eight and nine percent -- even before this period, India was ranked fourth in terms of economic growth among emerging economies. This is a very impressive record indeed.

Let's think about the future: the dragon vis-a-vis the elephant. Which country has the growth momentum? China, I believe, still has some of the excellent raw fundamentals -- mostly the social capital, the public health, the sense of egalitarianism that you don't find in India. But I believe that India has the momentum. It has the improving fundamentals. The government has invested in basic education, has invested in basic health. I believe the government should do more,but nevertheless, the direction it is moving in is the right direction. India has the right institutional conditions for economic growth, whereas China is still struggling with political reforms.

I believe that the political reforms are a must for China to maintain its growth. And it's very important to have political reforms, to have widely shared benefits of economic growth. I don't know whether that's going to happen or not, but I'm an optimist.Hopefully, five years from now, I'm going to report to TEDGlobal that political reforms will happen in China.

Don't believe the rumors until they deny them

賓架信唔過，點算？ - 信報網站

Don't believe the rumors until they deny them

2011年9月14日

畢老林 投資者日記

賓架信唔過，點算？

畢者推介

‧內地創業板曾經集萬千寵愛於一身，被喻為有關部門「十年磨一劍」的產物。然而，在高發行市盈率、高股價和高額超募資金拖累下，有學者預期八九成企業將於五至十年內退市。鐘林在B5頁「中國股市」探討創業板的糾結。

‧內地消費市場有所謂「金九銀十」的現象，意指隨着夏去秋來，市民消費也特別疏爽。然而，今年內地樓市卻出現「銅九鐵十」的情況，樓盤展銷會異常冷清。費高在B6 頁「股海One Piece」從另類角度窺探中國經濟。

‧香港回歸十多年，經濟結構卻比以前更單一，只有地產及金融獨沽兩味。在特首發表任內最後一份施政報告前夕，筆銘分析香港經濟的問題，勉勵一眾熱血八十後要千帆並舉，以商業救港。詳見B11 頁「筆聞集」。

9月13日，周二。公眾假期不想那麼貼市，原本打算寫一些「人味」濃一點的東西，惟開機check料，第一眼看見的是The Trouble with French Banks幾隻大字。法國銀行，又是法國銀行？來之安之，就看看發生什麼事。

We can no longer borrow dollars. U.S. money-market funds are not lending to us anymore. Since we don't have access to dollars anymore, we're creating a market in euros. This is a first… We will no longer be trusted at all and no one will lend to us anymore.

以上一段引言， We代表的是法國最大銀行法巴（BNP Paribas），發言者「隱姓埋名」，只知他是行中一名高層，而將法巴在市場上借不到美元、沒有同業願意相信它等商業秘密公諸於世的，是在這名高層口中套出真言的《華爾街日報》作者Nicholas Lecaussin。

記性不壞的讀者想必有印象，一兩個月前，法巴競爭對手法興（SocGen）「畀人搞」，市場盛傳這家法蘭西第二大銀行危在旦夕，「造謠」的是英國《周日郵報》（The Mail on Sunday）。消息觸發法興股價單日暴瀉一成半，管理層高調闢謠，事件鬧大，迫使報社自承報道失實且公開致歉。疑點既已釋除，理應告一段落，惟法興以至整個法國／歐洲金融業危機，非但沒有隨着「唯恐天下不亂」的媒體還銀行一個公道而紓緩，惡化速度反而比任何人想像快，現在輪到法巴成為負面報道的主角。

誠信易毀難建

一如法興，法巴在《華日》文章觸發股價劇挫後發表聲明，否認那位不透露姓名高層所說的每一句話。似曾相識吧？當一個人、一家公司以至一個國家要信誓旦旦地證明自己可靠，這個人，這家公司或這個國家，其實早已失信於天下，否則世界一開始就不會選擇聽信謠言。這是金融海嘯發生三年以來，老畢最深刻的體會。看看2008年雷曼倒閉與2011年歐洲銀行爆煲傳聞不絕於耳前前後後，銀行股價表現何其相似【圖1】，再回想2009年滙控（005）世紀供股和2011年滙豐香港員工唔炒又炒，什麼叫「在他們否認傳言前切勿輕易信之」（Don't believe the rumors until they deny them），答案不已寫在牆上？

回顧過去三年銀行股表現，老畢還有另一番感受。銀行是一個講「信用」的行業，正所謂牙齒當金使，從【圖1】可見，2008年9月中雷曼倒閉前，歐資銀行股價普遍已跌個四腳朝天（今年同期銀行股跌幅比08年尤有過之），滙控乃當時唯一股價錄得升幅的歐資行。這或多或少跟獅子錢莊最早承認次按業務出問題，沒有隱惡揚善、彰顯較高的透明度誠信獲加分有以致之。然而，滙控這種相對出色的股價表現，在2011年歐洲銀行危機中已不復見，管理層當然可以賴大圍環境差；海嘯後滙控股價跌至33元，的確關「大圍」事，但雷曼爆煲前大笨象股價在眾錢莊中一枝獨秀，又點解釋？誠信無價，這樣看，滙控在香港裁員一事上出爾反爾，賓架不再牙齒當金使，連誠信也告破產，大笨象要做逆市奇葩，憑什麼？

「五人幫」玩轉地球

法國銀行問題愈描愈黑，愈解畫愈「論盡」，投資者聞風色變，risk on半日又risk off。話說周一晚《金融時報》刊了一則消息，指中投老總樓繼偉上周率團訪問意大利，跟意國財長商討大手購債事宜。中投買意債只聞樓梯響，未有任何實質行動，惟已足令華爾街周一尾市拗身反彈收復失地。意大利公債拍賣結果差強人意，但受中國再度充當歐洲白武士消息刺激，二手市場意債價格一度反彈（孳息回落）。可是，法巴陷困消息入市後，中國打救意大利的「喜訊」立遭淹沒，意大利二年期國債孳息急速回升【圖2】。

難怪有人說，今時今日，市場圍繞着五個人「氹氹轉」。邊五個？默克爾、奧巴馬、貝南奇、溫家寶，同埋……帕潘德里歐囉！

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